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I. General introduction 
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Everybody lies and has been lied to. Lying is a widespread phenomenon in society and 
occurs on a daily basis. On the one hand, deception is treated as a socially 
unacceptable behavior. When we were kids, we were taught by our parents and 
teachers that honesty is one of the most important virtues and that we will be 
punished if we lie. In the famous novel for children “The Adventures of Pinocchio,” 
Pinocchio’s lying behaviors are condemned and are punished. As he tells a lie, his 
nose grows. On the other hand, we were also taught that we should care about others’ 
feelings and welfare and that we sometimes need to lie to preserve others’ feelings and 
welfare. Let us imagine the following: your friend is very ill and his doctor tells you 
that there is no hope for him to recover. When you are visiting him at the hospital, you 
probably say to him that he will overcome the illness, although you know he might die 
soon. Here, lying as a social lubricant can help to ease social interactions, save others 
from unhappiness, comfort others’ misfortune, or even help others.  
It is controversial whether lying is acceptable. According to Kantian moral theory, 
telling a lie is never morally permissible, regardless of the outcomes (Kant, 1797). 
However, the utilitarianism school of thought implies that lying is morally right if it 
produces more welfare than any other act could have (Carson, 2010). When you are 
facing lies and truth in different contexts, how do you choose or feel? What is the 
neural basis of your decisions to lie and tell the truth, as well as the affections toward 
lies and truth? How do different outcomes influence your decision whether to lie or 
tell the truth? 
This dissertation is designed to provide some insights into these questions. In the 
Theoretical section (Section II), the background, the potential impact of altruistic 
outcomes on the process of deception, and the potential psychological and neural 
mechanisms underlying deception are introduced. In the Experimental section 
(Section III), three studies and the corresponding results are reported and discussed 
in detail. In the General discussion section (Section IV), the findings from the three 
studies are summarized and discussed.  
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1. Deception 
1.1. Definition of deception 
There are many arguments about how deception should be defined. Coleman and Kay 
emphasized the prototype of lies and three elements of lies: factual falsity, intent to 
speak falsely, and intent to deceive (Coleman and Kay, 1981). There are two 
controversial points. First, the factual falsity might not be essential because a 
communicator might not remember/know the facts and commit an honest mistake 
(Miller, 1983). It is more important that the communicator believes that his/her 
statement is false than the factual falsity of the statement. Second, lies do not require 
the communicator’s intention to deceive others, such as the bald-faced lie, which is 
told by a person who knows that a listener knows it is a lie (Carson, 2010). In this 
dissertation, the focus is mainly placed on the essence of deception, namely, a 
deliberate statement (not necessarily an oral one) that is made with the 
communicator’s belief in its falsity, but without providing any clues regarding its 
falsity1. When people talk about deception in their daily lives, they tend to use “lies,” 
“lying,” or “deceit” which typically refers to deception in oral or written 
communication. Therefore, the words “lies,” “lying,” “deceit,” and “deception” are 
used in turn. Based on the previous definitions (Masip et al., 2004; Alexander, 2007), 
in this thesis the definition of deception is: “the deliberate or intentional manipulation 
of information, whether or not it is successful, through the use of verbal or nonverbal 
cues that the communicator believes are false.” 
                                                   
1 A statement is not a lie, if someone provides the statement which he/she believes it is false and he/she 
also provides some clues of its falsity, such as “a ‘signal of irony’-perhaps by means of tones and choice 
of words” (Chisholm and Feehan, 1977). 
Categories of lies based on different financial outcomes 
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1.2. Categories of lies based on different financial outcomes 
In many behavioral experiments about deception, incentivized contexts were used to 
induce lying behaviors. Based on the financial outcomes of the lies (Gneezy, 2005; 
Erat and Gneezy, 2012), lies can be classified as Pareto white lies, altruistic white lies, 
selfish black lies, and spiteful black lies (Figure 1.1; the receiver in the figure is the 
recipient, and the sender is the communicator). Pareto white lies increase the payoffs 
for both the communicator and the recipient. Altruistic white lies increase the 
recipient’s payoff at the expense of the communicator’s payoff. Selfish black lies 
increase the communicator’s payoff at the expense of the recipient’s payoff, and 
spiteful black lies decrease the payoffs for both the communicator and the recipient. 
Here, the difference between Pareto white lies and altruistic white lies is whether a 
liar sacrifices his/her interests. Similar to this notion, altruistic lies can be defined as 
“false statements that are costly for the liar and are made with the intention of 
misleading and benefitting a target” and are classified as a subset of prosocial lies (i.e., 
“false statements made with the intention of misleading and benefitting a target”) 
(Levine and Schweitzer, 2014).  
In this dissertation, prosocial and altruistic lies are not distinguished. The focus is 
placed on the financial outcomes of certain acts2 (i.e., lying or truth-telling): 1) other-
profit outcomes (altruistic outcomes): the outcomes of lies and truth that financially 
benefit others (they could also financially benefit the communicators at the same 
time)3 and 2) communicator-profit outcomes: the outcomes of lies and truth that only 
financially benefit the communicators. 
                                                   
2 There are many other ways of classifying different types of lies. For example, lies can be classified as 
spontaneous-isolated lies and memorized-scenario lies (Ganis et al., 2003). Nevertheless, other 
classifications of lies are beyond the scope of the dissertation.  
3 If lies with other-profit outcomes financially benefit both the communicators and the recipients, this 
type of lies belongs to “Pareto white lies” and “prosocial lies” as mentioned previously. If lies with 
other-profit outcomes only financially benefit the recipients, this type of lies belongs to “prosocial lies” 
as mentioned previously. 
Theoretical section 
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Figure 1.1: Taxonomy of lies based on financial consequences (adapted from Erat and 
Gneezy, 2012). The origin represents the payoffs of truth-telling. If dots locate above the 
zero line in the horizontal dimension, receivers’ payoffs are increased when senders lie. If 
dots locate below the zero line in the horizontal dimension, receivers’ payoffs are 
decreased when senders lie. Here, the receiver is the recipient, and the sender is the 
communicator. 
1.3. Psychological costs of lying 
Some economic theories suggest that (dis)honest decisions are only determined by the 
trade-off between punishments if the misreporting is caught and the monetary 
benefits of successful misreporting (Becker, 1968). Under this assumption, in the 
absence of punishments or the possibility of being detected, dishonest behaviors 
should be observed if the behaviors lead to larger monetary benefits. In an 
incentivized experiment outside the laboratory (Abeler et al., 2014), experimenters 
phoned a representative sample in Germany and asked them to play a coin tossing 
game. In the game, reporting tails yielded the payoff of 15€, whereas reporting heads 
yielded nothing. In this setting, the actual results of coin tossing were only known by 
the participants themselves. Moreover, lying behaviors were not possible to be 
Psychological costs of lying 
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detected or punished. Nevertheless, the aggregate reporting behavior of most of the 
participants closely followed the expected truthful distribution. 4  When it was 
financially beneficial to lie, people did not lie maximally (Rosenbaum et al., 2014). 
The reluctance to deceive might be due to an aversion to lying (Gneezy, 2005; Gneezy 
et al., 2013) or guilt (Ellingsen et al., 2010; Battigalli et al., 2013), the intention to 
protect one’s positive self-concept or self-image (Mazar and Ariely, 2006; Mazar et al., 
2008; Shalvi et al., 2010; Ploner and Regner, 2013), etc.  
Accumulating evidence suggests that people have psychological costs of lying 
(Rosenbaum et al., 2014). In a typical cheap talk sender-receiver game (Gneezy, 
2005), private information about two payoff allocations for two players is provided to 
one of the players as a message sender (Figure 1.2). The other player as a message 
receiver has no information about the allocations. Each allocation contains a payoff 
for the sender and a payoff for the receiver. Whenever an allocation is advantageous 
to the sender, it is disadvantageous to the receiver, and vice versa. The message 
sender transmits the receiver a message, indicating the advantageous allocation for 
the receiver. Purely based on the message, the receiver chooses to implement one of 
the payoff allocations. By manipulating the message, the sender can influence the 
receiver’s decisions. Gneezy invited participants to play the sender-receiver game as 
senders. In the example presented in Figure 1.2, if a receiver chooses option A, the 
sender earns $5, and the receiver earns $15. If the receiver chooses option B, the 
sender earns $15, and the receiver earns $5. Therefore, option A is the advantageous 
allocation for the receiver and option B is the advantageous allocation for the sender. 
The sender transmits one of the two messages. Sending message A (i.e., “option A will 
earn you more money than option B”) is truth-telling, whereas sending message B is 
lying. In addition to the sender-receiver game, Gneezy invited participants to play a 
dictator game (i.e., a control game) as dictators to investigate participants’ decisions 
                                                   
4 The results might be caused by participants’ concerns for anonymity. Some participants might believe 
that the caller knew their names or address.  
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in the context without honesty concerns. 5  He found that participants chose the 
allocations that were advantageous to them more often in the dictator game than in 
the deception game.6 In other words, individuals were less willing to earn more by 
lying. Even in the context where lies helped both the senders and the receivers, a large 
fraction of the participants still behaved honestly (Erat and Gneezy, 2012). In addition, 
people tended to avoid settings that enabled them to deceive others (Shalvi et al., 
2011b) and even showed a dislike for lies, independent of the outcomes (López-Pérez 
and Spiegelman, 2013). These results strongly support the notion that people have 
psychological costs of lying to some extent. Therefore, in addition to the function of an 
external cost-benefit analysis, the intrinsic costs of lying are important in the 
deception decision-making process. 
1.4. The impact of altruistic outcomes on the process of deception 
Batson and Shaw (1991) defined altruism as “… a motivational state with the ultimate 
goal of increasing another’s welfare.” By modulating the psychological costs of lying, 
the altruistic outcomes of lying influence the deceptive decision-making process and 
the attitude toward lies. For example, altruistic lies might be more acceptable, since 
they might be good for maintaining a positive self-image or reducing the negative 
feelings (e.g., guilt or aversion) caused by lying. From the perspective of recipients 
and third-party observers, studies found that altruistic lies, which benefited others, 
were judged to be morally appropriate (Hayashi et al., 2014; Levine and Schweitzer, 
2014). When making judgments about whether to trust someone, children valued 
                                                   
5 In a dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986), a participant as a dictator can choose one of the two 
monetary allocations (each contains a payoff for the dictator and a payoff for a recipient) to be 
implemented. The recipient has to passively accept the allocation chosen by the dictator. In this game, 
the dictator’s concerns for the recipient’s payoff can be measured. In contrast to the deception game, 
participants in the dictator game do not need to lie to opponents to earn more money. Therefore, the 
dictator game is the situation without honesty concerns. 
6 In a deception game, if a sender intends to send a truthful message, he/she should phrase a message 
by choosing the allocation that is advantageous to a receiver. A message would be untruthful and 
misleading if it indicates that the disadvantageous allocation to the receiver is advantageous to the 
receiver (i.e., choosing the allocation that is advantageous to the sender). 
The impact of altruistic outcomes on the process of deception 
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both honesty and benevolence (Xu et al., 2013). Individuals who lied to promote the 
interests of others earned more children’s trust than individuals who lied to promote 
their own interests (Fu et al., 2015). In addition to children, the altruistic outcomes of 
deception increased trust in adults as well (Levine and Schweitzer, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 1.2: The sender-receiver game used in the study by Gneezy (2005). Private 
information about two payoff allocations (option A and B) for two players is presented to 
one of the two players as a message sender, whereas the other player as a message 
receiver has no information about the allocations. Each allocation contains a payoff for the 
sender and a payoff for the receiver. The sender sends one of the two messages to the 
receiver (message A or B). After receiving the message, the receiver implements one of 
the payoff allocations. In this example, the receiver earns more money if he/she 
implements option A than if he/she implements option B. Therefore, message A is truthful, 
whereas message B is untruthful.  
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From the perspective of communicators, dishonesty is more likely to be viewed as 
morally acceptable and elicits less guilt if it benefits others (Gino et al., 2013). 
Participants were more likely to cheat when the benefits of cheating were split with 
another person (Wiltermuth, 2011). In a revised sender-receiver game (Erat and 
Gneezy, 2012), a message sender has the private information about two allocations 
and the result of the die roll, which represents one of the two allocations. In the 
example shown in Figure 1.3, the roll of a die “5” represents option A, which contains 
a payoff of $20 for the sender and a payoff of $20 for the receiver. The message 
sender sends a message to a message receiver, indicating the result of the die roll. 
After receiving the message, the receiver chooses a number. If the receiver chooses the 
actual outcome of the die roll, the option represented by the outcome will be 
implemented (i.e., option A). Otherwise, the other option will be implemented (i.e., 
option B, which contains a payoff of $19 for the sender and a payoff of $30 for the 
receiver). Erat and Gneezy invited participants to play the game as senders. They 
found that a significant fraction of the participants (33%; 33 out of 101) told an 
altruistic lie to profit the receivers, even at the expense of the participants’ payoffs. In 
a die-under-cup game (Shalvi et al., 2011a; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013), 
participants were asked to shake a cup to roll a die inside, check the results through 
the hole at the top of the cup, and report the result of the die roll. The numbers on the 
die led to different payoffs. When the payoffs would be donated to a cancer charity, 9% 
of the participants lied that they had rolled a ‘6’, which led to the highest payoff (Lewis 
et al., 2012). The 9% of the participants is considerably higher than the 2.5% of the 
participants who lied for participants’ personal gains in the study by Shalvi et al. 
(Shalvi et al., 2011a). The findings from these behavioral studies support that 
altruistic outcomes influence the process of deception. 
The impact of altruistic outcomes on the process of deception 
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Figure 1.3: The revised sender-receiver game used in the study by Erat and Gneezy (2012). 
A message sender has private information about two allocations (option A and B), as well 
as the result of the die roll, which represents one of two allocations (e.g. “5” represents 
option A). The message sender sends one of the messages to a message receiver. After 
receiving the message, the receiver chooses a number. If the receiver chooses the actual 
outcome of the die roll (“5” in this example), option A will be implemented. If the 
receiver chooses one of the other numbers (“1,” “2,” “3,” “4,” or “6” in this example), 
option B will be implemented. In this example, the message of “The outcome of the roll of 
die was 5” is truthful. 
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2. The psychological mechanisms underlying deception 
Lying requires multiple psychological processes, including, but not limited to, 
emotion, executive control, memory, and response inhibition (Spence, 2004; Spence 
et al., 2004; Vrij, 2008; Farah et al., 2014). Two aspects, cognitive control and 
emotion, are introduced to provide the readers with some basic knowledge. 
2.1. Cognitive control 
Predominantly, telling a lie is thought to be more cognitively demanding than telling 
the truth (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2006).  When an individual tells a lie, the 
reaction time was longer than the reaction time when he/she tells the truth (Walczyk 
et al., 2003; Abe et al., 2008). Moreover, liars who reported stories in the reverse 
order thought they performed worse and behaved more nervously and were easier to 
be detected as liars by observers than the liars who reported stories in the 
chronological order (Vrij et al., 2008).  
However, the reaction times for lying can be reduced by training or preparation. 
Compared with participants who were not instructed to speed up lying or were not 
provided the chance to prepare, participants who were allowed to do so spent less 
time on providing dishonest responses (Walczyk et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2012). In fact, 
the differences in the reaction times between lying and truth-telling were erased in 
participants who received training to speed up their deceptive responses (Hu et al., 
2012). Moreover, the high proportion of lying responses made lying easier 
(Verschuere et al., 2011), meaning that it is easier to lie if one lies more. 
Accumulating evidence suggests that honesty also requires considerable time and 
cognitive control. In the die-under-cup game, the investigators manipulated the time 
available for participants to report the die roll results. Participants lied less in the 
situation without time pressure than in the situation with high time pressure (Shalvi 
Emotion 
13 
 
et al., 2012). The result suggests that individuals need sufficient time to enhance the 
level of self-control and resist the temptation to lie for more benefits (Rosenbaum et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, when participants’ self-control resources were depleted, the 
dishonest behaviors increased (Mead et al., 2009; Gino et al., 2011). In the afternoon, 
when the self-control resources were more intensely depleted, participants lied or 
cheated more often than in the morning (Kouchaki and Smith, 2014). These findings 
suggest that considerable time and cognitive control are also important for making 
honest decisions.  
2.2. Emotion 
Emotion has been long emphasized to have an important role in moral behavior 
(Eisenberg, 2000). Higher-order emotions, such as guilt and shame (with negative 
valence), and basic emotions, such as anger and fearfulness, arise from the violation 
of a moral standard or moral transgression (Tangney et al., 1992; Eisenberg, 2000). 
Emotional processes are also engaged in moral judgment to ground (Greene et al., 
2001; Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006), rise from, and possibly further drive or 
modulate moral decision-making (Tangney et al., 2007; Malti and Krettenauer, 2013). 
More specifically, by influencing approach-avoidance tendencies, such as achieving 
anticipated positive emotions and avoiding anticipated negative emotions, individuals 
might be motivated to make different moral decisions (Baumeister et al., 2007). 
As moral behaviors, lying and truth-telling, have a strong association with emotions 
(Farah et al., 2014). Liars have strong emotional experiences, such as guilt or fear 
(Ekman, 1985, 1989). The emotion experienced when an individual decides to lie and 
the expectation of the emotional experience of lying might influence deception-related 
decisions (Gaspar and Schweitzer, 2013).  
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3. The neural mechanisms underlying deception 
3.1. Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
During the last decade, the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
investigate the neural correlates of deception has increased dramatically. This 
technique measures brain activity by detecting the changes associated with blood flow, 
which supports increased neuronal activity (Huettel et al., 2004). The following brief 
introduction of this technique and data analysis methods is based on multiple 
resources (Ogawa et al., 1990; Huettel et al., 2004; Amaro and Barker, 2006; 
Poldrack, 2007; Poldrack et al., 2011; Lindquist and Wager, 2014).  
3.1.1. A brief introduction of the fMRI technique 
When neurons in the brain become active, the amount of blood flowing through the 
area is increased. More oxygen is used by the cells and further leads to a relative 
increase in the local blood oxygen levels. The changes in the state of hemoglobin 
oxygenation can be detected by blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast 
images. The oxygen concentration endows the hemoglobin molecule with different 
magnetic properties. Oxyhemoglobin is diamagnetic, whereas deoxyhemoglobin is 
paramagnetic, which distorts the magnetic field. The diamagnetic blood interferes 
with the MR signal less, and, therefore, the areas with higher oxyhemoglobin 
concentrations provide a higher signal than the areas with low concentrations. The 
change in the MR signal from the neuronal activity is the hemodynamic response 
(HDR). One to two seconds after the neuronal events, the BOLD signal begins and 
increases to a peak at approximately five seconds. After the neurons stop firing, the 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
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BOLD signal falls below the original level (i.e. undershoot7), and the signal recovers to 
the baseline over time. 
3.1.2. Preprocessing steps 
The aim of fMRI data analyses is to estimate the changes in the BOLD signal in 
response to some stimulation or manipulation. There are some basic preprocessing 
steps during the initial analysis of the fMRI data. These steps usually include slice 
timing correction, motion correction, coregistration, normalization, and spatial 
smoothing. Quality control of the data is crucial. However, none of these operations is 
mandatory and necessary in all cases. Here, the basic preprocessing steps are briefly 
introduced. 
The slice timing correction corrects for the acquisition time of each slice of one 
functional volume. Different slices from one functional volume are acquired 
sequentially in time. The slices can be acquired in ascending order, descending order 
or by using interleaved acquisition. A reference slice is usually chosen to correct the 
mismatch between the acquisition time of different slices. The data in other slices can 
be interpolated to match the timing of the chosen slice.  
Motion correction is performed to overcome the problem induced by participants’ 
movement during the scanning. Due to excessive motion, the voxel’s intensity might 
be contaminated by the signal from the nearby voxels. A reference image (usually the 
first or the mean image) is chosen to compensate for participants’ movement. A rigid 
body transformation is applied to the other images to match the reference image. 
Algorithms are used to search for the best parameter estimates to translate and rotate 
the images to match the reference image. The estimated motion parameters are 
usually used as covariates in the first level of analysis. Because this strategy is unable 
                                                   
7 The venous bed capacity makes the regional blood volume normalize more slowly than the changes in 
blood flow, and leads to high deoxy-hemoglobin concentration (Jones et al., 1998). 
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to correct for more complex artifacts caused by severe head motion, a participant’s 
data can be excluded if his/her movement is too severe. 
Coregistration is used to map the results from the analysis of low-resolution 
functional images onto a high-resolution structural image. The structural image is 
usually co-registered to the first or the mean functional image and warps to a 
standard template. The transformations can be applied to the functional images. This 
step is also associated with the next phase: normalization. Normalization is used to 
register the data into a standard anatomical space, which can be reported in standard 
coordinate systems, including the Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) and Talairach 
systems.  
Spatial smoothing is used to blur the image intensities by applying a spatial 
smoothing kernel. The amount of smoothing is determined by the width of the 
distribution. If the Gaussian kernel is used, the width of the distribution is the full 
width at half-maximum (FWHM). By removing the high-frequency information, 
smoothing improves inter-subject registration and increases the signal-to-noise ratio.  
3.1.3. Individual-level analyses and group-level analyses 
A general linear model (GLM) is often used to analyze a voxel’s time series to 
determine if its BOLD signal matches the presented pattern of multiple events. A 
GLM analysis is typically a univariate analysis and is performed for every voxel in a 
single subject. The BOLD time series at every voxel can be expressed as a linear 
function of a design matrix, the vector of parameter estimates β, and the error term. 
The β value is estimated and used to test for an effect of interest. Since the GLM is 
applied to each voxel across the brain, the effect of interest is to determine the voxels 
that are statistically significantly activated by the experimental conditions. In the 
statistical analysis, the null hypothesis (H0) is that the manipulation or the 
independent variable in the experiment has no effect, and there is no difference 
among the β values under different experimental conditions (e.g., H0: β1 = β2). The 
research hypothesis (H1) is that the manipulation or the independent variable has an 
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effect, and there are differences between the β values under the experimental 
conditions (e.g., H1: β1 ≠ β2). 
The group-level analyses are used to combine the results from single subjects to 
obtain group results and test the hypotheses at the group level. One important issue 
during the group-level analyses is the multiple comparisons correction. Each voxel 
needs at least one hypothesis test, and, therefore, there are up to thousands of 
statistical tests that must be performed. Multiple comparisons might result in false 
positives. Some approaches, such as family-wise error (FWE) and false discovery rate 
(FDR) corrections, are used to control the false positive rates. 
The standard approach to analyze the fMRI data is whole brain analysis, which 
focuses on the data for each voxel in the whole brain. In addition, region-of-interest 
(ROI) analyses can be used if the researchers have a specific hypothesis about a 
specific brain region (ROI) that is associated with a particular cognitive process, 
rather than the whole brain. The ROIs can be defined using anatomical criteria or 
functional activity maps. The common approach is to extract the signal from the 
defined ROIs and perform further analyses. ROI analyses reduce the total number of 
statistical comparisons, minimize the need for multiple comparison corrections, and 
increase the signal-to-noise ratio.  
3.2. Previous neuroimaging studies of deception 
3.2.1. Paradigms used in previous neuroimaging studies of deception 
In many previous neuroimaging studies of deception, a typical paradigm called 
“instructed paradigms” was used to investigate the neural correlates of lying (Greely 
and Illes, 2007; Sip et al., 2008; Schauer, 2010; Wright et al., 2013; Farah et al., 
2014). In this type of paradigm, investigators usually instruct participants to provide 
truthful or untruthful answers to some questions at a specific time. The contents of 
the questions included memories (Spence et al., 2001; Abe et al., 2007; Abe et al., 
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2008; Bhatt et al., 2009; Ito et al., 2011), possession of an item (Langleben et al., 
2002; Luan Phan et al., 2005), personal information or experience (Ganis et al., 2003; 
Nunez et al., 2005; Abe et al., 2006; Ganis et al., 2009; Ganis et al., 2011), knowledge 
of a mock crime (Mohamed et al., 2006; Kozel et al., 2009a; Kozel et al., 2009b), or 
valence of pictures (Lee et al., 2010). For example, in a word memory task (Abe et al., 
2008), participants were asked to learn words during the study phases and provide 
responses during the test phrases. During the test phase, participants were placed in 
the MRI scanner and observed previously studied words (“True targets”), non-studied 
words (“False targets” that are semantically related to the studied items), and 
unrelated words (“New targets”). “True targets,” “False targets,” and “New targets” 
were assigned to “Truth” blocks, in which participants were asked to provide a 
truthful response to each stimulus. “True targets” and “New targets” were assigned to 
“Lie” blocks, in which participants were asked to provide an untruthful response to 
each stimulus, namely “New” responses for “Truth targets” and “Old” responses for 
“New targets.” 
In recent years, another type of experimental paradigm emerged (hereafter called 
spontaneous paradigms). This type of paradigm allows participants to freely make 
honest or dishonest decisions by providing motivations to lie, such as monetary 
rewards (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Greene and Paxton, 2009; Bhatt et al., 2010; Sip 
et al., 2010; Sip et al., 2012; Baumgartner et al., 2013; Abe and Greene, 2014; Sun et 
al., 2015a; Volz et al., 2015), or reducing the time of the experiment (Ding et al., 2013). 
For example, in a coin-flip task (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe and Greene, 2014), 
participants were asked to predict the outcomes of coin flips in the scanner. Every 
correct prediction led to a monetary benefit. In the no opportunity condition, 
participants had to explicitly report their prediction and then indicate whether their 
prediction was correct. In the opportunity condition, participants did not need to 
explicitly report their prediction. Therefore, they had the chance to win more money 
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by lying about the correctness of their prediction in the opportunity condition. In this 
task, participants were able to spontaneously make decisions to lie or to tell the truth.8 
Although the instructed paradigms are relatively easy to perform and provided us 
with a large amount of knowledge about the potential neural correlates associated 
with lying, there are some limitations when researchers use them to investigate 
deception. For example, the paradigms might have poor ecological validity (Ganis and 
Keenan, 2009) and different involvements of emotions and cognitive control (Farah 
et al., 2014). It seems that lies in the spontaneous paradigms might be more similar to 
real-life lies. Therefore, it is worth investigating the differences in the processes of 
lying and truth-telling between instructed and spontaneous paradigms. 
3.2.2. Brain regions associated with deception 
Meta-analyses of deception, which are mostly based on instructed experiments (Christ 
et al., 2009; Farah et al., 2014), revealed several brain regions that were more active 
during lying than truth-telling. These regions include the dorsal lateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) (Lee et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2005; Luan Phan et al., 2005; Nunez et 
al., 2005; Abe et al., 2006; Abe et al., 2007), the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) 
(Langleben et al., 2002; Langleben et al., 2005; Ganis et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010; 
Sun et al., 2015b), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (Langleben et al., 2005; Nunez et 
al., 2005; Christ et al., 2009; Ganis et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2015b), 
the insula (Nunez et al., 2005; Mohamed et al., 2006; Christ et al., 2009; Ganis et al., 
2009; Kozel et al., 2009a; Lee et al., 2009; Ito et al., 2011), the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) (Langleben et al., 2002; Ganis et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2005; Mohamed 
et al., 2006; Christ et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009), the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 
(Spence et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2002; Christ et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010; Cui et al., 
2014; Sun et al., 2015b), and the middle frontal gyrus (MFG) (Ganis et al., 2003; 
                                                   
8 Despite the fact that in the opportunity condition participants could freely make their decisions to lie 
or to tell the truth, the experimental design suffered the drawback that the researchers could not 
identify lying and truth-telling trials because they did not know participants’ actual predictions. 
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Langleben et al., 2005; Nunez et al., 2005; Christ et al., 2009; Ganis et al., 2009; 
Kozel et al., 2009a; Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010; Ito et al., 2011; Sun et al., 
2015b). The next section presents a brief introduction to the brain regions associated 
with deception. These areas are also thought to relate to cognitive control, emotion, 
and reward-processing. 
3.2.2.1. Cognitive control 
Section 2.1 presents the findings from previous behavioral studies of the reaction 
times for lying and truth-telling, as well as the influence of self-depletion and time-
limit on the lying frequencies. In addition to the behavioral findings, new perspectives 
are provided by the neuroimaging studies of deception. Attempted lying was linked to 
the activation of executive brain regions (Christ et al., 2009; Farah et al., 2014). A 
meta-analysis compared the activation likelihood estimate (ALE) 9  maps of three 
aspects of executive control (i.e., working memory, inhibitory control, and task 
switching) with the ALE maps of deceptive responses (versus truthful responses) 
(Christ et al., 2009). The deception related regions, such as the VLPFC, the anterior 
insula (AI), and the ACC, were also activated in the tasks associated with the executive 
control. In addition, the DLPFC and the posterior parietal cortex were overlapping 
regions that were activated in the tasks associated with both deception and working 
memory. Therefore, lying was thought to be more cognitively demanding, whereas a 
truthful response was treated as a default behavior (Spence et al., 2004).  
The instructed paradigms were often used in studies supporting the notion of a higher 
requirement for cognitive control during lying. Nevertheless, in the study by Greene 
and Paxton (2009), which used a spontaneous paradigm, truth-telling is believed to 
be cognitively demanding. According to the self-report accuracy in the opportunity 
                                                   
9 The activation likelihood estimation quantifies the degree of anatomical overlap across neuroimaging 
studies that are based on peak-voxel coordinate information (Farah et al., 2014). 
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condition, participants were classified as honest, dishonest or ambiguous.10 In the 
comparison of the loss trials in the opportunity condition11 and the loss trials in the no 
opportunity condition,12 no significant effects were identified in honest participants. 
In contrast to the honest participants, dishonest participants showed activation in the 
ACC, the DMPFC, the DLPFC, the VLPFC (control-related prefrontal regions), and the 
right parietal lobe. Moreover, increased activity in the bilateral DLPFC was also 
identified in the dishonest participants in the comparison of win trials in the 
opportunity condition13 and win trials in the no opportunity condition.14 Since the 
DLPFC was activated in both the lying associated contrast and the truth-telling 
associated contrast, the researchers concluded that the DLPFC participates in the 
process of actively deciding whether to lie, regardless of the choice made. In addition, 
dishonest individuals might require extra effort when they choose to forgo 
opportunities for dishonest gain. 
Given the potential differences in the neural correlates of spontaneous and instructed 
lying/truth-telling, a meta-analysis was performed to investigate the different neural 
processes of lying in instructed studies and volitional studies (Lisofsky et al., 2014). 
The results showed an increased activation in the bilateral IPL during volitional lying 
(versus instructed lying). In the volitional studies included in this meta-analysis, 
participants were not instructed to respond truthfully or untruthfully at a specific 
time. Nevertheless, in some of the studies, participants were asked to follow some 
                                                   
10 In Greene and Paxton’s experiment (2009), the chance level of the accuracy should be 50%. Fourteen 
participants with the highest accuracies (higher than 69%, mean = 84%) were classified as dishonest. 
Fourteen participants with the lowest accuracies (mean = 52%) were classified as honest. Others were 
classified as ambiguous (N = 7; mean = 62%). 
11 In the loss trials from the opportunity condition, the behavior of claiming that their predictions were 
wrong, to a great extent, is honest. 
12 In the loss trials from the no opportunity condition, the behavior of claiming that their predictions 
were wrong is honest. 
13 In the win trials from the opportunity condition, dishonest participants’ responses could be either 
truthful (honest) or untruthful (dishonest). Because the actual predictions were unknown, honest and 
dishonest responses in the wins trials from the opportunity condition could not be identified in this 
experiment. 
14 In the win trials from the no opportunity condition, the behavior of claiming that their predictions 
were right is honest. 
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rules. For instance, participants should imagine monetary gains from their successful 
feigning (Lee et al., 2002; Browndyke et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2009; McPherson et al., 
2011) or achieve an approximate balance between honest and dishonest responses 
(Spence et al., 2008). 
3.2.2.2. Emotion 
Emotion is essential for human behaviors (Pessoa, 2009). Regions such as the 
amygdala, the insula, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex are 
related to different basic emotions (anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and happiness), 
different dimensions of emotions (arousal and valence) (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998; 
LeDoux, 2000; Phelps et al., 2001; Phan et al., 2002; Anders et al., 2008; Hamann, 
2012), social emotions (Lamm and Singer, 2010), and moral emotions (Moll et al., 
2002b). 
From the perspective of communicators, a large amount of neuroimaging literature 
consistently showed the involvement of the anterior insula and the amygdala in lying 
(Abe et al., 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Christ et al., 2009; Baumgartner et al., 
2013; Farah et al., 2014; Lisofsky et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2015a; Volz et al., 2015). In a 
study of broken promises (Baumgartner et al., 2009), researchers used a modified 
version of a trust game, where participants acted as trustees (second movers) and first 
made a promise about whether they would always, mostly, sometimes or never pay 
back real money to an investor (first mover). Based on the trustees’ promises, 
opponents acting as investors decided whether to trust the trustees and invest money. 
Afterward, participants chose to keep or break the promise they made. Compared 
with honest participants who behaved more trustworthily, dishonest participants 
showed significant activation in the ACC and the DLPFC in the trials with promises 
(versus trials without promises) during the first 6 seconds of the decision phase 
(phase A). In addition, increased activity was observed in the amygdala in the second 
3 seconds until the button press (phase B). The authors further found that the return 
rates negatively correlated with activity in the ACC and the left DLPFC during phase A 
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and the left amygdala during phase B. These findings suggest that the dishonesty 
involves an emotional conflict.  
From the perspective of a third party or a recipient, emotion-related brain regions 
were also involved during the process of lying behaviors. In a study that investigated 
the judgment about others’ intention to deceive, participants watched videos of 
several actors lifting a box and judged if the actors were trying to deceive the 
observers about the box’s weight (Grèzes et al., 2004). The amygdala and the anterior 
cingulate cortex were activated when participants judged that the actors were 
misleading the observers. In another study (Grezes et al., 2006), participants watched 
videos of actors (either themselves or others) lifting a box and judged if the 
experimenter had misled the actors or if the actors had misled the experimenter as to 
the actual weight of the box. The amygdala was activated upon the judgment that the 
experimenter misled participants, compared with the other judgments (participants 
misled the experimenter, others misled the experimenter, and the experimenter 
misled others). These findings suggest that activity in the amygdala was modulated by 
the affective reaction that occurs when detecting deceiving behaviors or being 
deceived. 
3.2.2.3. Reward processing 
The motivation to achieve pleasant states and avoid unpleasant states guides human 
behavior and decisions (Daw et al., 2006; Linke et al., 2010). The striatum, 
particularly the nucleus accumbens (NAcc; part of the ventral striatum), is a key 
structure linked to the anticipation of rewards, such as monetary benefits (Delgado et 
al., 2000; Berns et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001a; Knutson et al., 2001b; O'Doherty, 
2004; Bartra et al., 2013) or social rewards (Izuma et al., 2008; Spreckelmeyer et al., 
2009; Häusler et al., 2015). However, activation in the reward-related regions was 
rarely observed in previous studies of deception, particularly in the studies that used 
the instructed paradigms. The results might be due to the lack of monetary or social 
rewards as the consequences of successful lying. The paradigms that can motivate 
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people to lie by providing monetary or social rewards are important to better 
understand the reward process in deception. Abe and Greene (2014) performed a 
study to investigate the relation between anticipated reward and dishonest behaviors. 
In addition to the coin-flip task used in the study by Greene and Paxton (2009), 
participants performed a monetary incentive delay (MID) task,15 which was used to 
maximize the affective and motivational aspects of reward processing (Knutson et al., 
2000). The authors found that the individuals who had stronger NAcc responses to 
the anticipated reward in the MID task exhibited 1) higher rates of dishonest behavior 
(indexed by improbably high levels of self-reported accuracy in the coin-flip task) and 
2) greater involvement of the DLPFC when refraining from dishonest gain. The results 
suggest the important roles of the reward-related regions, particularly the NAcc, in 
(dis)honest decision-making in the incentivized contexts.  
Furthermore, the reward-related regions might also be related to the process or the 
expectation of dishonest gain. Successful lies also elicited higher activation in the 
ventral striatum compared with lies that were caught and punished (Sun et al., 2015a). 
In the broken promises study (Baumgartner et al., 2009), compared with the honest 
participants, significant activation in the right ventral striatum was observed in 
dishonest participants in the trials with promises, which might increase the chance of 
obtaining the dishonest gain. Therefore, deception, particularly in the incentivized 
contexts, might require the involvement of the reward-related brain regions to 
process potential rewards. 
                                                   
15 In the MID task, participants press a button during the brief presentation of a target (duration of the 
presentation: 0.15-0.45s) to earn a financial reward or to avoid a financial loss. They then get the 
feedback of their performance. 
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4. Summary 
To date, the neural mechanisms underlying the process of deception are not well 
understood, particularly the differences between spontaneous and instructed lying 
and truth-telling, as well as the impact of altruistic outcomes on the process of 
deception. Three studies were performed and reported in the Experimental section to 
provide some insights into these questions (Section III). Study 1 was performed to 
investigate the different neural mechanisms underlying lying and truth-telling 
between the recently evolved spontaneous paradigms, in which participants make 
decisions on their own initiative, and the instructed paradigms, in which participants 
make decisions to lie and tell the truth at a specific time by following the instructions. 
The aims of Study 2 and Study 3 are to investigate the impact of altruistic outcomes 
on the neural processes underlying lies and truth. Specifically, Study 2 was performed 
to investigate the impact of altruistic and self-profiting outcomes on the deceptive 
decision-making process and the underlying neural mechanisms. Study 3 was 
performed to investigate the recipients’ neural responses to lies and truth based on 
outcomes that are either beneficial or harmful to the recipients.  
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5. Study 1: Different neural mechanisms underlying 
spontaneous and instructed deceptive decision-making 
process 
The associated work has been published in Yin Lijun, Reuter Martin and Weber 
Bernd (2016). Let the man choose what to do: Neural correlates of spontaneous 
lying and truth-telling. Brain and Cognition, 102, 13-25.  
Author contributions: L.Y. and B.W. designed research; L.Y. performed research; 
L.Y. analyzed data; L.Y., M.R., and B.W. wrote the paper.  
5.1. Introduction 
Experimental paradigms are crucial to investigate the neural correlates of deception. 
In the last decade, popular paradigms used to investigate the neural processes 
involved in lying are called “instructed paradigms” (please see Section 3.2.1 for more 
details). Since participants are not usually allowed to make their choices freely, the 
instructed paradigms have been criticized. In particular, the mental processes of lying 
in the instructed paradigms are thought to be widely different from lies in real life, 
and, therefore, the instructed paradigms are not suitable for investigating deception 
(Greely and Illes, 2007; Sip et al., 2008). Unlike the instructed paradigms, the 
recently developed spontaneous paradigms allow individuals to freely decide whether 
to lie and when to lie.  
The aim of Study 1 is to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying (un)truthful 
responses, which were given on one’s own initiative and by following others’ 
instructions. A modified sic bo16 gambling game (Eadington, 1999) was adopted to 
                                                   
16 The original Sic bo game is a casino game, in which people can bet on one of multiple options based 
on different combinations of three dice. 
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allow individuals to be more involved in the experiment. In this game, individuals 
were asked to predict the outcomes of three dice rolls and bet real money. After the 
outcomes of the rolls were presented, they reported whether their predictions were 
correct and they were paid according to their reports. In the spontaneous session, 
participants could freely make decisions. If their predictions were wrong, they could 
still win the stakes by providing untruthful responses with regard to their predictions. 
In the instructed session, free decisions were not allowed. Participants should report 
their betting results truthfully or untruthfully, according to the presented instructions. 
When their predictions were wrong, they could only win the stakes if the instructions 
asked them to provide untruthful responses with regard to their predictions. 
Otherwise, they would lose the stakes. 
5.2. Materials and methods 
5.2.1. Participants 
Fifty-four healthy male participants17 (mean ± s.d. age = 26.1 ± 3.8 years ranged from 
19 to 36 years) took part in the fMRI experiment. All participants had no history of 
substance abuse, psychiatric or neurological disorders. They had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. The ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of 
Bonn approved the study. All participants provided their written informed consent.  
5.2.2. Tasks 
Study 1 used a modified sic bo game (Figure 5.1). In the original game, combinations 
of three dice formed various betting options. In the simplified version used here, only 
two betting options were available (“big” if the sum of the three dice is from 11 to 18 
                                                   
17 Some studies found that male and female tend to tell different types of lies. Men told more self-
oriented lies than women, whereas women told more other-oriented lies than men (DePaulo et al., 
1996; Feldman et al., 2002). In Study 1, male participants were recruited, in order to enlarge the 
sample size of the partially dishonest group and to avoid potential gender differences in the process of 
lying. 
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and “small” if the sum of the dice is from 3 to 10)18. In each trial, participants were 
given a budget of 25€. At the beginning of each trial, they should predict the sum of 
the three dice and bet on either “big” or “small” by pressing the button on the 
response grips within 2.5s. After that, one image of three dice was presented, and 
participants knew whether their prediction was correct. It was followed by a fixation 
cross for 2-6s. A certain stake (see Section 5.2.3 for more details) was then presented, 
accompany with a question that whether their prediction was correct. Participants 
should answer the question by pressing the button on the response grips within 3.5s. 
If participants chose “Yes”, they would win the stake. Otherwise, they would lose the 
stake. In the first session of the experiment (i.e., spontaneous session/condition; 
Figure 5.1A), participants could freely make decisions to lie or to tell the truth. In the 
second session of the experiment (i.e., instructed session/condition; Figure 5.1B), 
participants would first see the instruction (i.e., “Right answer” or “Wrong answer”). 
According to the instruction, they provided truthful or untruthful answers. To be 
more specific, if the instruction was “Wrong answer” (i.e., instructed lying), 
participants should choose “No” in the trials where their predictions were correct and 
choose “Yes” in the trials where their predictions were incorrect. The positions of the 
betting options and the report options were counterbalanced within each session and 
each participant.  
  
                                                   
18 In the original gambling game, when the sum is from 4 to 10, gamblers win if they bet on “small”. But 
the 3 (3 ones) is not a winning bet in this case. When the sum is from 11 to 17, gamblers win if they bet 
on “big”. But the 18 (3 sixes) is not a winning bet in this case. To simplify the game, the rules have been 
changed as described here. 
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Figure 5.1: The experimental paradigm in Study 1. In the spontaneous session (A; marked 
in light yellow), a participant should first predict the result of the dice roll and bet on 
either “big” or “small” within 2.5s. The participant then freely reported his betting result 
within 3.5s. In this example, the result of the dice roll was “big,” but the participant’s 
prediction was “small.” Thus, his prediction was wrong. In the instructed session (B; 
marked in light blue), the participant would first see the instruction (i.e., “Right answer” 
or “Wrong answer”). When the instruction was “Right answer,” the participant should 
report his betting result truthfully (i.e., choosing “No”). When the instruction was “Wrong 
answer,” the participant should report his betting result untruthfully (i.e., choosing “Yes”). 
In both sessions, if the participant’s prediction was incorrect, choosing “No” would be 
“truth-telling” and choosing “Yes” would be “lying.” (S_Truth_InC: spontaneous truth-
telling in the trials with incorrect predictions; S_Lie_InC: spontaneous lying in the trials 
with incorrect predictions; I_Truth_InC: instructed truth-telling in the trials with incorrect 
predictions; I_Lie_InC: instructed lying in the trials with incorrect predictions) 
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5.2.3. Design and stimuli 
The first fMRI session (i.e., spontaneous session) contained 162 trials in three 
scanning runs. There were nine different stakes (i.e., 0.5€, 1€, 1.5€, 9.5€, 10€, 10.5€, 
19.5€, 20€, and 20.5€). Each of the nine different stakes repeated 18 times. The 
second fMRI session (i.e., instructed session) contained 180 trials in four scanning 
runs. Each of the nine different stakes repeated 20 times. Different amounts of trials 
in the instructed paradigm were designed to ensure that there were sufficient trials in 
each experimental condition. Each run lasted about 13 minutes. The spontaneous 
session started ahead of the instructed session, to avoid the possibility that the 
instructions of the instructed session influence the decision-making process in the 
spontaneous session. In total, the experimental stimuli consist of 342 different dice 
pictures. Half of the pictures showed “big” results and the other half showed “small” 
results. 
5.2.4. Procedure 
Before scanning, participants read the instructions of the spontaneous session. 
Participants were informed that the betting results they reported, rather than the 
actual betting results, would determine their final payoffs. In addition, the 
experimenters knew that there were opportunities for them to win stakes by choosing 
“Yes,” regardless of their actual predictions, and there was no punishment if they 
respond incorrectly. After reading the instructions, participants performed one testing 
session and one practice session on the computer. The testing session was adopted to 
test participants’ calculation ability. It contained 20 rounds of the calculation task. In 
each round, participants would see a picture of three dice. Within 2.5s, they should 
report “big” if the sum was from 11 to 18 and “small” if the sum was from 3 to 10. 
Participants with accuracy rates higher than 75% were allowed to perform the fMRI 
experiment. In the practice session, they completed 18 simulated trials to get familiar 
with the experiment. After that, participants entered the scanner and performed the 
first experimental session (i.e., spontaneous session).  
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After the spontaneous session, participants got out of the scanner and took a break of 
30 minutes. During the break, participants were asked whether they knew that there 
were opportunities for them to earn more money by reporting the betting results 
untruthfully in the trials with incorrect predictions. Participants then filled in the 
questionnaires (see below for more details). After that, they read the instructions of 
the instructed session and completed 18 simulated trials on the computer. 
Participants performed the second fMRI session (i.e., instructed session) if the 
accuracy in the practice session was higher than 75%. After the instructed session, 
participants completed the questionnaires (see below for more details). 
After each experimental session, based on a 9-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
neutral, 9 = strongly agree), participants gave their ratings to the following question: 
“How much do you agree with the following sentence: when the prediction was wrong, 
choosing ‘Yes’ in the experiment is a ‘lie’.” Participants also reported the emotional 
valence of different decisions (i.e., spontaneous lying and truth-telling, and instructed 
lying and truth-telling in the trials with incorrect predictions), based on Lang’s Self-
Assessment Manikin Valence Scale  (Lang, 1980). The nine-level scale (1 = very 
unhappy, 5 = neutral, 9 = very happy) was adapted from PXLab (Irtel, 2008).  
After the experiment, one trial from the spontaneous session and one trial from the 
instructed session were randomly chosen. Participants were paid accordingly. During 
the whole experiment, the words “cheat,” “dishonest,” “honest,” “lie,” and “truth” 
were not used in all of the instructions.  
5.2.5. Data acquisition 
Participants’ responses in the scanner were collected via an MRI-compatible response 
device (NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway). All images were collected on a Siemens 
Trio 3.0 Tesla scanner with a twelve-channel head coil. Structural scans included T1-
weighted images (TR = 1570 ms; TE = 3.42 ms; flip angle = 15°; slice thickness =1.0 
mm). The functional scans were collected using T2*-weighted echo planar images 
(EPI) pulse sequence employing a BOLD contrast (flip angle = 90°; TR = 2500 ms; TE 
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= 30 ms; field of view =192 × 192 mm2; 64 × 64 acquisition matrix; 37 slices with 3 
mm slice thickness; in-plan resolution = 3 × 3 mm2). 
The MRI scanner was upgraded to a Tim Trio System, after collecting data from 33 
participants. Nine participants were scanned in the upgraded scanner. 19  Scans 
included T1-weighted images (TR = 1660 ms; TE = 2.75 ms; flip angle = 9°; slice 
thickness = 0.8 mm) and T2*-weighted echo planar images (flip angle = 90°; TR = 
2500 ms; TE = 30 ms; field of view =192 × 192 mm2; 96 × 96 acquisition matrix; 37 
slices with 3 mm slice thickness; in-plan resolution  = 2 × 2 mm2). 
5.2.6. Data analyses 
Data from twelve participants were excluded: nine for technical reasons (image 
artifacts or excessive head movement of >3 mm or 3° of rotation); one for lack of 
attention in the experiment; one for not following the instructions in the instructed 
session; and one for not knowing that there were opportunities for him to earn more 
money by reporting incorrectly in the spontaneous session. 
5.2.6.1. Behavioral data analyses 
Statistical analyses of frequencies and reaction times for different decisions were 
conducted with SPSS 22.0 (IBM Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA). One sample t-tests, 
an independent sample t-test, and 2-by-2 repeated-measure analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) models were performed as indicated. All P values were two-tailed, and P < 
0.05 was considered statistically significant. Post hoc analysis with Bonferroni 
correction was applied for significant interaction effects if any.  
Based on the number of (un)truthful responses in the spontaneous trials with 
incorrect predictions and the consideration for sufficient trials (> 15) for fMRI data 
                                                   
19 Among these nine participants, three participants behaved more honestly (honest group) and four 
participants behaved more dishonestly (dishonest group) in the spontaneous trials with incorrect 
predictions. Two participants were partially dishonest (partially dishonest group). Please see Session 
5.2.6.1 and Session 5.3.1.1 for more details about the group classification.  
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analyses, participants were further classified into three groups: partially dishonest 
group, honest group, and dishonest group. Participants were assigned to the partially 
dishonest group, if they had at least 15 spontaneous lying trials with incorrect 
predictions and 15 spontaneous truth-telling trials with incorrect predictions. 
Participants were assigned to the honest group, if they had less than 15 spontaneous 
lying trials with incorrect predictions and more than 15 spontaneous truth-telling 
trials with incorrect predictions. Participants were assigned to the dishonest group, if 
they had less than 15 spontaneous truth-telling trials with incorrect predictions and 
more than 15 spontaneous lying trials with incorrect predictions. 
5.2.6.2. Functional MRI data analyses 
SPM8 was adopted for fMRI data analyses (Welcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For each subject, EPI 
images were first realigned and resliced. Data sets that exhibited an overall movement 
of >3 mm or 3° of rotation in each run were not included. The anatomical image was 
co-registered with the mean EPI image of each participant which was further 
segmented. To create a template and normalize functional and anatomical scans to 
the MNI template, the SPM8’s DARTEL tool was used. The normalized functional 
images were subsampled to 1.5 × 1.5 × 1.5 mm3 and spatially smoothed using an 8-
mm FWHM (full-width half maximum) Gaussian filter. High-pass temporal filtering 
with a cut-off of 128s was performed to remove low-frequency drifts. 
Statistical analyses of the fMRI data were estimated using a general linear model 
(GLM). To investigate the neural correlates of (un)truthful responses in spontaneous 
and instructed paradigms, trials were categorized as the following conditions: (1) 
spontaneous lying in the trials with incorrect predictions (S_Lie_InC), (2) 
spontaneous truth-telling in the trials with incorrect predictions (S_Truth_InC), (3) 
spontaneous truth-telling in the trials with correct predictions (S_Truth_C), (4) 
instructed lying in the trials with incorrect predictions (I_Lie_InC), (5) instructed 
truth-telling in the trials with incorrect predictions (I_Truth_InC), and (6) instructed 
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truth-telling in the trials with correct predictions (I_Truth_C). Six regressors of 
interest above were included in the GLM, which contained the onsets of the reporting 
phase. Data from 19 participants who had sufficient trials in each condition (the 
partially dishonest group) were used. A parametric modulator of the betting values 
(i.e., stakes) for each regressor of interest was adopted. The onsets of the other events 
(i.e., trials with no response, the betting phase, spontaneous lying and instructed lying 
trials with correct predictions, and instructed trials with wrong responses) were 
combined into one other regressor. To remove the effects of head motion, six 
estimated head movement parameters were included. For the group-level analysis, 
four contrasts (i.e., S_Lie_InC, S_Truth_InC, I_Lie_InC, and I_Truth_InC) were 
entered into a flexible factorial model with two within-group factors (paradigm (the 
spontaneous paradigm and instructed paradigm) and decision (Lie_InC and 
Truth_InC)).  
To further explore the neural processes involved in spontaneous truth-telling among 
participants with different levels of honesty, a similar GLM was built for those 
participants who were more honest (N = 15; the honest group). Considering the 
limited spontaneous lying trials with incorrect predictions (i.e., S_Lie_InC), five 
regressors of interest were included: (1) S_Truth_InC, (2) S_Truth_C, (3) I_Lie_InC, 
(4) I_Truth_InC, and (5) I_Truth_C. The onsets of the other events (i.e., trials with 
no response, the betting phase, spontaneous lying and instructed lying trials with 
correct predictions, instructed trials with wrong responses, and limited trials of 
S_Lie_InC) were combined into one other regressor. For the group-level analysis, a 
two-sample t-test was performed to compare the dishonest group (N = 19) with the 
honest group (N = 15) when they were making decisions to tell the truth in the 
spontaneous trials with incorrect predictions (S_Truth_InC).20 
                                                   
20 The sample size in the dishonest group is not sufficient (N = 8). Therefore, the data from the 
dishonest group were not analyzed here.  
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A similar GLM was built for participants who behaved more dishonestly (N = 8; the 
dishonest group). Considering the limited spontaneous truth-telling trials with 
incorrect predictions (i.e., S_Truth_InC), five regressors of interest were included: (1) 
S_Lie_InC, (2) S_Truth_C, (3) I_Lie_InC, (4) I_Truth_InC, and (5) I_Truth_C. The 
onsets of the other events (i.e., trials with no response, the betting phase, spontaneous 
lying and instructed lying trials with correct predictions, instructed trials with wrong 
responses, and limited trials of S_Truth_InC) were combined into one other 
regressor. To check that if the instructed paradigm used in Study 1 is comparable to 
the instructed paradigms used previously, paired t-tests were performed to compare 
I_Lie_InC with I_Truth_InC and I_Truth_C. Since in previous instructed studies 
participants were not classified into different groups based on honesty levels, data 
from all 42 participants were used. 
All results were voxel-level height uncorrected thresholded at P < 0.001 with spatial 
extent threshold set at k = 50, to take both type I and type II errors into account 
(Lieberman and Cunningham, 2009). 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Behavioral results 
5.3.1.1. Lying frequencies in the spontaneous session 
After the spontaneous session, all of the 42 participants whose data were used in fMRI 
data analyses, reported that they knew there was a possibility for them to win more 
money by choosing “Yes” when their predictions were incorrect. 
In the spontaneous session, when participants correctly predicted the sum of the dice, 
they chose to respond honestly most of the time (N = 42; mean frequency of lying ± 
s.d.: 2.1% ± 2.83). In the 19 partially dishonest participants, the mean frequency of 
lying is 59.1% (s.d. = 16.5; ranged from 21% to 77%). In the remaining participants, 
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fifteen participants were more honest (mean frequency of lying ± s.d.: 3.1% ± 3.7; 
ranged from 0% to 13%), and eight participants were more dishonest (mean frequency 
of lying ± s.d.: 99.4% ± 0.5; ranged from 99% to 100%). The honesty levels here only 
describe participants’ behaviors in the experiment. No conclusions could be drawn 
concerning their personalities or behavioral tendencies in general. In the 19 partially 
dishonest participants, the mean frequencies (± the standard deviation) of dishonest 
responses in the three stake ranges (0.5€ to 1.5€, 9.5€ to 10.5€, and 19.5€ to 20.5€) 
were 7.0% (± 8.0), 75.9% (± 31.0), and 91.8% (± 17.4) (Figure 5.2; red bars). 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The behavioral results in Study 1. In 19 partially dishonest participants, the 
frequencies of lying and truth-telling in three betting value ranges are revealed. 
(S_Lie_InC: spontaneous lying in the trials with incorrect predictions; S_Truth_InC: 
spontaneous truth-telling in the trials with incorrect predictions; S_Truth_C: spontaneous 
truth-telling in the trials with correct predictions; error bars: s.d.) 
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5.3.1.2. Response accuracies in the instructed session 
In the instructed session, the means and the standard deviations of response 
accuracies in all participants (N = 42) are listed in Table 5.1. To check whether 
participants paid enough attention to the task in the instructed session, the response 
accuracies in the four conditions (i.e., I_Lie_InC, I_Lie_C, I_Truth_InC, and 
I_Truth_C) were compared to the chance level (i.e., 50%). The accuracies in all four 
conditions were significantly higher than the chance level (all ts(41) > 21, all ps < 
0.001). 
Table 5.1 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1.3. Judgments and emotional valence of (un)truthful responses  
After each session, participants answered the question: “How much do you agree with 
the following sentence: when the prediction was wrong, choosing ‘Yes’ in the 
experiment is a ‘lie’” based on a 9-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = neutral, 9 = 
strongly agree). The ratings of 42 participants in the spontaneous session (mean ± s.d: 
6.98 ± 2.5) were significantly higher (t(41) = 4.88, P < 0.001) than ratings in the 
instructed session (mean ± s.d: 4.45 ± 2.73; Figure 5.3). In the partially dishonest 
participants (N = 19), ratings in the spontaneous session (mean ± s.d: 7.05 ± 1.93) 
were also significantly higher than ratings in the instructed session (mean ± s.d: 4.42 
± 2.78; t(18) = 4.32, P < 0.001). 
 
Response accuracies (%; N = 42) in the instructed session 
Conditions 
Mean (s.d.) 
Lying Truth-telling 
Incorrect predictions 91.3 (10) 93.5 (6) 
Correct predictions 96 (5) 87.9 (11) 
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Figure 5.3: The behavioral results in Study 1. Participants’ ratings toward the expression: 
“when the prediction was wrong, choosing ‘Yes’ in the experiment is a ‘lie’” (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = neutral, 9 = strongly agree; ***P < 0.001; N = 42; error bars: s.d.). 
 
To investigate whether there were differences in the emotional valences of lying and 
truth-telling between the spontaneous and instructed sessions, a 2 (decision: lying in 
the trials with incorrect predictions and truth-telling in the trials with incorrect 
predictions) × 2 (session: spontaneous and instructed sessions) ANOVA in 19 partially 
dishonest participants were performed.21 The main effects of decision and session 
were not significant (F(1, 18) = 2.39, P = 0.14; F(1, 18) < 0.01, P > 0.99). A significant 
interaction effect of session × decision was observed (F(1, 18) = 13.10, P = 0.002; Figure 
5.4). Post hoc analysis showed that the emotional valence of instructed lying (mean ± 
s.d: 6.4 ± 2.0) was higher than the emotional valence of instructed truth-telling (mean 
± s.d: 5.0 ± 1.6) in the trials with incorrect predictions (t(18) = 2.79, P = 0.01; 
I_Lie_InC > I_Truth_InC), whereas the valence of spontaneous truth-telling (mean ± 
s.d.: 5.9 ± 1.9) was higher than the valence of spontaneous lying (mean ± s.d: 4.5 ± 1.4) 
                                                   
21  Because of limited S_Lie_InC trials in honest participants and limited S_Truth_InC trials in 
dishonest participants, the analyses of valence were only performed in the participants from the 
partially dishonest group.  
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in the trials with incorrect predictions (t(18) = 2.17, P = 0.04; S_Truth_InC > 
S_Lie_InC). 
 
Figure 5.4: The behavioral results in Study 1. The emotional valences of lying and truth-
telling in the spontaneous and the instructed trials with incorrect predictions (1 = very 
unhappy, 5 = neutral, 9 = very happy; *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01; N = 19; error bars: s.d.). 
 
To investigate if there were differences in the reaction times for lying and truth-telling 
between two sessions, a 2 (decision: lying in the trials with incorrect predictions and 
truth-telling in the trials with incorrect predictions) × 2 (session: spontaneous and 
instructed sessions) ANOVA was conducted in the 19 partially dishonest 
participants.22 A significant main effect of session was observed (spontaneous session > 
instructed session; F(1, 18) = 42.77, P < 0.001). The main effect of decision and the 
interaction effects were not significant (F(1, 18) = 3.31, P = 0.09; F(1, 18) = 0.19, P = 0.89). 
The means and the standard deviations of reaction times are listed in Table 5.2. 
                                                   
22 Because of limited S_Lie_InC trials in the honest participants and limited S_Truth_InC trials in 
dishonest participants, the analyses of reaction times were only performed in the participants from the 
partially dishonest group. 
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Table 5.2 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2. Functional MRI results 
5.3.2.1. Comparisons between instructed lying and instructed truth-telling 
The contrasts of I_Lie_InC versus I_Truth_InC and I_Lie_InC versus I_Truth_C 
activated multiple regions (Table 5.3; N = 42). Most of the regions were also identified 
in previous studies that used instructed paradigms (Christ et al., 2009), including the 
inferior frontal gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus, the anterior cingulate cortex, the 
insula, the inferior parietal lobule, and the supramarginal gyrus.  
5.3.2.2. Interaction effects of decision and session  
The results of a 2 (decision: Truth_InC and Lie_InC) by 2 (session: spontaneous and 
instructed sessions) whole-brain ANOVA analysis in 19 partially dishonest 
participants are listed in Table 5.4. No significant interaction effect of (S_Lie_InC - 
S_Truth_InC) versus (I_Lie_InC - I_Truth_InC) was observed. The opposite 
interaction effect of (S_Truth_InC - S_Lie_InC) versus (I_Truth_InC - I_Lie_InC) 
significantly activated the left precentral gyrus, the right ventral lateral prefrontal 
cortex (VLPFC), the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the inferior parietal lobe 
(IPL), and the medial prefrontal gyrus (Figure 5.5A). Post-hoc analyses showed that 
activity in the right VLPFC, the right DLPFC, and the right IPL was significantly 
higher in the S_Truth_InC condition than activity in the S_Lie_InC condition. No 
significant difference was observed in the contrast of I_Lie_InC versus I_Truth_InC 
(Figure 5.5B). 
Reaction times in Study 1 (ms) 
Conditions 
Mean (s.d.) 
Lie_InC Truth_InC 
Spontaneous session 1175 (275) 1226 (206) 
Instructed session 963 (212) 1020 (247) 
Lie_InC: lying in the trials with incorrect predictions. 
Truth_InC: truth-telling in the trials with incorrect predictions. 
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Table 5.3 
 
 
Brain activation in the comparison between instructed lying and instructed truth-telling 
in all 42 participants 
Condition Hem Voxel Brain area 
MNI 
coordinates Z 
value 
x y z 
I_Lie_InC > I_Truth_InC 
 
L 66 Middle frontal gyrus -41 18 50 3.81 
 
L 304 Anterior cingulate gyrus -5 37 23 3.76 
 
L 122 Superior frontal gyrus -5 9 69 3.6 
 
L 104 Superior frontal gyrus -9 30 56 3.49 
 
L 251 Supramarginal gyrus -54 -57 35 3.47 
 
R 63 Sub-gyral 20 12 38 3.43 
I_Lie_InC < I_Truth_InC 
 
R 201 Middle occipital gyrus 45 -74 26 4.29 
I_Lie_InC > I_Truth_C 
 
L 1109 Middle frontal gyrus -38 18 41 4.85* 
 
L 277 Inferior frontal gyrus -48 24 -4 4.55 
 
L 1233 Inferior parietal lobule -47 -56 47 4.24* 
 
R 86 Inferior frontal gyrus 50 24 -6 4.22 
 
L 469 Sub-gyral -15 22 42 3.84 
 
L 309 Supplementary motor area -2 27 56 3.76 
 
L 276 Superior frontal gyrus -20 42 36 3.75 
 
L 148 Superior frontal gyrus -26 54 20 3.69 
 
R 152 Middle frontal gyrus 29 50 17 3.67 
 
R 52 Middle frontal gyrus 35 53 5 3.56 
I_Lie_InC < I_Truth_C 
 
R 679 Middle temporal gyrus 47 -74 26 4.38* 
 
M 250 Anterior cingulate cortex 0 53 -1 3.83 
Results were all voxel-level height thresholded at P < 0.001, k > 50 voxels, 
uncorrected. 
* survived after cluster-level family wise error (FWE) correction, PFWE-corrected < 0.05. 
I_Lie_InC: instructed lying in the trials with incorrect predictions. 
I_Truth_InC: instructed truth-telling in the trials with incorrect predictions. 
I_Truth_C: instructed truth-telling in the trials with correct predictions. 
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Figure 5.5: fMRI results in Study 1. (A) In the partially dishonest participants (N = 19), 
the right VLPFC, the right DLPFC, and the right IPL were significantly activated in the 
contrast of (S_Truth_InC - S_Lie_InC) versus (I_Truth_InC - I_Lie_InC) (P < 0.001, k > 
50, uncorrected). (B) Parametric estimates were extracted from the whole cluster in the 
three regions. (VLPFC: ventral lateral prefrontal cortex; DLPFC: dorsal lateral prefrontal 
cortex; IPL: inferior parietal lobule; **: P < 0.01, n.s.: not significant; error bars: s.e.m.) 
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Table 5.4 
fMRI results of a whole brain ANOVA analysis in 19 partially dishonest participants  
L/R Voxel Brain area 
MNI 
coordinates Z value 
x y z 
Main effect: spontaneous session > instructed session 
 
R 1444 Inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula 47 21 -3 4.58* 
 
L 1973 Inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula -38 23 -7 4.55* 
 
R 2882 Inferior parietal lobule 47 -44 54 4.52* 
 
R 1585 Middle frontal gyrus 35 51 21 4.31* 
 
R 959 Anterior cingulate cortex 3 30 30 4.19* 
 
L 1666 Inferior parietal lobule -38 -48 42 4.10* 
 
R 1009 Medial globus pallidus 17 -6 2 4.08* 
 
L 833 Middle frontal gyrus -47 37 23 4.06 
 
R 461 Middle occipital gyrus 33 -86 3 3.90 
 
L 189 Post cingulate cortex -2 -21 30 3.80 
 
L 615 Precuneus -5 -68 59 3.80 
 
L 88 Medial globus pallidus -14 -3 0 3.70 
 
R 308 Superior frontal gyrus 6 21 65 3.61 
 
L 52 Middle occipital gyrus -27 -89 -3 3.38 
Main effect: instructed session > spontaneous session 
 
R 132 Parietal lobe 60 -17 47 4.36 
Main effect: Lie_InC > Truth_InC 
 
L 463 Subgenual anterior cingulate cortex -6 30 -3 4.28 
 
R 58 Brainstem 5 -36 -23 3.41 
 
L 61 Medial frontal gyrus -6 55 24 3.41 
 
L 90 Angular -44 -72 36 3.35 
Main effect: Truth_InC > Lie_InC 
 
R 221 Middle occipital gyrus 42 -45 56 3.54 
Interaction: (S_Lie_InC - S_Truth_InC) - (I_Lie_InC - I_Truth_InC) 
 
None 
      
Interaction: (S_Truth_InC - S_Lie_InC) - (I_Truth_InC - I_Lie_InC) 
 
L 84 Precentral gyrus -9 -27 72 3.97 
 
R 150 Ventral lateral prefrontal cortex 43 51 -9 3.64 
 
R 77 Inferior parietal lobule 48 -41 42 3.60 
 
R 106 Medial frontal gyrus 15 43 30 3.50 
 
R 77 Inferior parietal lobule 48 -56 48 3.44 
 
R 97 Dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex 39 31 23 3.43 
Results were voxel-level height thresholded at P < 0.001, k > 50 voxels, uncorrected. 
* survived after cluster-level family wise error (FWE) correction, PFWE-corrected < 0.05. 
S: the spontaneous session/paradigm; I: the instructed session/paradigm. 
InC: the trials with incorrect predictions; C: the trials with correct predictions. 
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5.3.2.3. Comparisons between spontaneous truth-telling in partially dishonest 
participants and spontaneous truth-telling in honest participants  
To explore the neural correlates of spontaneous truth-telling in participants with 
different levels of honesty, partially dishonest participants’ (N = 19) decisions of 
spontaneous truth-telling with incorrect predictions (i.e., S_Truth_InC) were 
compared to the decisions of honest participants (N = 15). Several brain regions, 
particularly the right VLPFC, the right DLPFC, and the right IPL, showed increased 
BOLD signals in the partially dishonest participants, compared with honest 
participants. None survived in the opposite contrast (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 
 
fMRI results of the comparisons between spontaneous truth-telling in partially dishonest 
participants and spontaneous truth-telling in honest participants 
L/R Voxel Brain area 
MNI 
coordinates 
Z 
value 
x y z 
S_Truth_InC: partially dishonest group > honest group 
 
L 392 Inferior frontal gyrus/anterior cingulate cortex -35 23 -11 4.46 
 
R 580 Superior frontal gyrus 20 39 45 4.21* 
 
L 469 Inferior parietal lobule -51 -57 45 4.14 
 
L 430 Middle frontal gyrus -39 30 39 3.95 
 
R 94 Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 42 48 -11 3.72 
 
R 104 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 38 45 18 3.61 
 
R 58 Superior parietal lobule 21 -65 51 3.56 
 
R 53 Superior parietal lobule 36 -48 60 3.52 
 
L 53 Middle frontal gyrus -42 51 5 3.47 
 
R 55 Inferior parietal lobule 50 -54 45 3.39 
S_Truth_InC: partially dishonest group < honest group 
 
None 
      
Results were voxel-level height thresholded at P < 0.001, k > 50 voxels, uncorrected. 
* survived after cluster-level family wise error (FWE) correction, PFWE-corrected < 0.05. 
S_Truth_InC: spontaneous truth-telling in the trials with incorrect predictions. 
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5.4. Discussion 
Study 1 is the first fMRI study to directly compare the (un)truthful responses in the 
spontaneous paradigm with the (un)truthful responses in the instructed paradigm. 
The essential difference between the spontaneous paradigm and the instructed 
paradigm is whether individuals can freely make their decisions to lie. Based on 
participants’ judgments of untruthful responses, spontaneous untruthful responses 
were thought to be closer to the concept of “lies” compared with instructed untruthful 
responses. The results suggest that untruthful responses in the instructed paradigm 
differ from untruthful responses in the spontaneous paradigm. The notion was further 
supported by the different emotional valences in two paradigms. In the spontaneous 
session, the emotional valence that occurred when participants were telling the truth 
was significantly more positive than when they were lying, whereas the opposite trend 
was observed in the instructed session, namely, lying was more positive than truth-
telling. The more negative valence observed during spontaneous lying compared with 
truth-telling might be due to high psychological costs of lying (e.g., positive self-image 
damage, guilt or aversion) (Gneezy, 2005; Mazar and Ariely, 2006; Mazar et al., 2008; 
Ellingsen et al., 2010; Shalvi et al., 2010; Battigalli et al., 2013; Gneezy et al., 2013; 
Ploner and Regner, 2013). The reversed patterns observed in the instructed session 
might be due to great monetary gains and low psychological costs of lying. These 
behavioral findings suggest that the ecological validity and the emotional responses to 
lying and truth-telling differ in these two paradigms. 
At the neural level, if (un)truthful responses in the two paradigms share the similar 
mental process and neural mechanisms, no significant interaction effect of the 
paradigm and decision would be expected. However, the effect of the interaction (i.e., 
(S_Truth_InC-S_Lie_InC) versus (I_Truth_InC-I_Lie_InC)) significantly activated 
the right DLPFC, the right VLPFC, and the right IPL. These regions were significantly 
activated in the comparison of spontaneous truth-telling versus spontaneous lying, 
but not in the comparison of instructed truth-telling versus instructed lying. Moreover, 
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compared with the honest participants, spontaneous truth-telling elicited higher 
activity in the right DLPFC, the right VLPFC, and the right IPL in dishonest 
participants. These three regions belong to a frontoparietal control system that is 
associated with cognitive control in decision-making processes (Vincent et al., 2008). 
The DLPFC has been reported to be involved in tasks requiring cognitive control and 
the inhibition of prepotent impulses (Sanfey et al., 2003; Aron et al., 2004; Spitzer et 
al., 2007). Our results are consistent with the previous findings in the study of Greene 
and Paxton (2009), suggesting that honest individuals required less cognitive effort to 
make honest decisions than dishonest individuals (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe and 
Greene, 2014). 
When using instructed paradigms, the complex executive functions associated with 
(dis)honest decision-making might not be fully investigated (Sip et al., 2008). The 
findings from Study 1 suggest two main points: 1) the neural processes involved in 
(dis)honest decision-making in the instructed paradigm differ from the neural 
processes involved in the spontaneous paradigm, particularly in the frontoparietal 
network and 2) in the incentivized and more natural setting, when individuals choose 
to tell the truth, extra cognitive control and greater involvement of the associated 
brain regions might be required to resist dishonest gain. 
5.5. Limitations 
There are some limitations in Study 1. First, although the experimental design in the 
spontaneous session allowed participants to freely make their decisions, they knew 
that their responses were being observed by others. The decision-making process 
might be different from the process in natural settings in which they can conceal their 
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lies23. Second, the instructed session was always conducted after the spontaneous 
session. The fixed order might induce habituation in the instructed session. A 
comparison between instructed lying and truth-telling was performed to investigate 
whether the instructed session could provide similar results as the previous instructed 
studies. Most of the activated brain regions were also identified in the previous 
instructed studies. Therefore, the instructed paradigm used in Study 1 is comparable 
to the previous instructed paradigms. Finally, the absence of other important factors, 
such as social interaction (Lisofsky et al., 2014), still induces substantial gaps between 
lies in real life and lies in the spontaneous paradigm in Study 1.   
                                                   
23 For example, in the study by Greene and Paxton (2009), participants’ predictions about the coin flips 
were not recorded in the condition with cheating opportunity. Therefore, dishonest participants could 
conceal their lying behaviors. But their study also suffers the drawback that researchers could not 
identify lying and truth-telling trials. 
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6. Study 2: The neural mechanisms underlying the 
modulation of altruistic outcomes on communicators’ 
deceptive decision-making process  
Collaborators on the research described in this section are Yang Hu, Dennis 
Dynowski, Jian Li, and Bernd Weber. (The running title of the manuscript: “The 
good lie: altruistic goals modulate processing of deception in the anterior insula.” 
Manuscript under review.) 
Author contributions: L.Y., Y.H., J.L., and B.W. designed research; L.Y., Y.H., and 
D.D. performed research; L.Y., Y.H., and J.L. analyzed data. 
6.1. Introduction 
Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that there are psychological costs of lying. 
Introducing honesty concerns in the economic decision-making process (i.e., lying 
could lead to higher monetary gains) decreases people’s tendency to pursue their own 
interests (Gneezy, 2005; Shalvi et al., 2011b). Such aversion can be further modulated 
by altruistic outcomes. For example, lying behavior increased if it benefited charities 
(Lewis et al., 2012). Altruistic outcomes might promote deception by overcoming the 
psychological barrier of lying. 
However, the neural mechanisms underlying the impact of altruistic outcomes on 
lying remain unknown. The aim of Study 2 is to investigate this research question. In 
Study 1, the behavioral and neural findings suggest that the spontaneous paradigms 
might be more suitable to investigate deception compared with the instructed 
paradigms. Therefore, Study 2 used the task that allows participants to freely make 
their decisions. An interactive game was adopted to better investigate the altruistic 
impact on deception and to overcome the limitations in Study 1 (particularly the lack 
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of social interaction). The sender-receiver game (Gneezy, 2005) was briefly 
introduced in Section 1.3. In the original version of the game, a sender has private 
information of two possible monetary distributions. The sender transmits the 
message about the advantageous option for the receiver. The receiver decides to 
implement one of the two options, purely based on the message. The game creates an 
incentivized context in which the sender can send an untruthful or truthful message to 
achieve different payoff outcomes. However, the potential problem is that truth-
telling behaviors might be “sophisticated deception,” meaning that a sender could 
send a truthful message with the expectation that the receiver does not believe the 
message and chooses the allocation that is advantageous to the sender (Sutter, 2009). 
In Study 2, the message conveyed from the sender is about a computer’s random 
choice of the payoff option and does not contain any information about the 
advantageous option.  The receiver does not directly choose to implement one of the 
two payoff options. Instead, the receiver chooses whether to believe the message. If 
the receiver believes the message, the payoff option chosen by the sender would be 
implemented. If the receiver does not believe the message, both players earn nothing. 
Two conditions were introduced, with either charities or senders themselves as the 
beneficiaries (i.e., charity-profit condition and self-profit condition) to test the effect 
of other- and self-profit outcomes. In the condition with honesty concerns to achieve 
higher payoffs, the senders could benefit themselves or a charity more by deceiving 
the receiver. In the study by Gneezy (2005), he compared the rates of choosing self-
benefiting allocations in a dictator game to the rates in the sender-receiver game to 
rule out the preferences for the payoff distribution and estimate the extent of honesty 
concerns. In a similar vein, in Study 2, a control condition was performed, in which 
the senders could achieve higher payoffs via telling the truth (i.e., condition with no 
honesty concerns).  
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6.2. Materials and methods 
6.2.1. Participants 
Forty-seven healthy participants (29 females; mean ± s.d. age = 25.77 ± 3.71 years 
ranged from 19 to 35 years) took part in the fMRI experiment. All participants 
reported no prior history of psychiatric or neurological disorders and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. All participants gave informed consent, and the study was 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Bonn. 
6.2.2. Tasks 
Study 2 adopted a modified sender-receiver paradigm (Figure 6.1). Participants, as 
senders, played the game with an anonymous receiver. In each trial, participants 
would first see two payoff options A and B. Each payoff option consisted of the payoff 
for the sender, which was represented by the blue bar, and the payoff for the receiver, 
which was represented by the red bar. If an icon of a pre-selected charitable 
organization was displayed, the sender’s payoff would be donated to the charity (i.e., 
the charity-profit condition; Figure 6.1A). If a blue silhouette was displayed, 
participants would be paid based on the sender’s payoff (i.e., the self-profit condition; 
Figure 6.1B). One payoff option was randomly chosen by a computer (indexed by an 
icon of the computer). By pressing the button on the response grips within 4s, 
participants selected one of the payoff options to phrase a message: “The computer 
chose option x to be implemented” (where x = A or B). After pressing the button on 
the response grips, a yellow frame appeared to index the corresponding choice for 
0.5s. A fixation cross was then displayed for a jittered interval (i.e., 8-10s minus the 
reaction time for that trial). 
After scanning, the computer would randomly select one trial with participants as the 
beneficiary and one trial with a pre-selected charity as the beneficiary. The receiver 
would receive the messages in the two selected trials, and the receiver chose one of the 
two options: believe or not believe. If the receiver chose to believe the messages, the 
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option selected by the participant would be implemented (Figure 6.1C). Otherwise, 
both the sender and the receiver would earn nothing (Figure 6.1D). After the receiver 
made the decisions, information including the payoff options, whether the sender lied 
or not, and the final implemented options would be presented to the receiver. The 
yellow frame indexed the final implemented payoff option. Crucially, from the 
sender’s perspective, if the computer chose the option with a high payoff for the 
senders, participants did not need to lie to get the higher payoff (i.e., no honesty 
concerns to get higher payoffs condition). Otherwise, participants would have honesty 
concerns to get the higher payoff (i.e., honesty concerns to get higher payoffs 
condition; Figure 6.1A and B). 
6.2.3. Design and stimuli 
The current event-related fMRI study adopted a 2 (beneficiary: participants or 
charitable organizations; abbreviation: Self or Charity) by 2 (honesty concerns: with 
or without honesty concerns to get higher payoffs; abbreviation: HonCon or 
NoHonCon) within-subject factorial design. One 40-min scanning run contained 192 
trials in total (48 trials per condition). In each trial, the payoff for the sender in one 
option was lower than the other one (Table 6.1). The low payoff for the sender was 
drawn out of the three monetary amounts (2€, 6€, or 10€). The high payoff for the 
sender was built based on the low payoff (2€, 6€, or 10€) with one of the following 
increments: 1€, 4€, 6€, 8€, and 15€ (abbreviation of the payoff difference: PD). The 
combination with the PD of 4€, 6€, and 8€ repeated four times and others (i.e., the 
PD of 1€ and 15€) repeated twice. The display positions of the high and low payoff 
options were counterbalanced within each participant. In half of the trials, the payoff 
for the receiver in both options was equal to the high payoff for the sender. In the 
other half of the trials, the receiver’s payoff was equal to the low payoff for the sender. 
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Figure 6.1: The experimental paradigm of the modified sender-receiver game in Study 2. 
A participant in the scanner played the game as a sender. The blue and the red bars 
represent the payoff for the sender and the payoff for an anonymous receiver, respectively. 
In this example, a computer chose the option with a low payoff for the sender (i.e.,  option 
A; indexed by the computer icon), meaning that the participant had honesty concerns to 
get the high payoff. The participant chose one of two payoff options to phrase a message 
(e.g., “The computer chose option B to be implemented”). The payoff for the sender 
would be donated to a pre-selected charity (A; indexed by the charity icon; 
Charity_HonCon_Lie) or obtained by the participant (B; indexed by the blue silhouette; 
Self_HonCon_Lie). After the scanning, an anonymous receiver would receive the 
messages from two randomly selected trials. If the receiver believed participant’s message 
(C), the option chosen by the participant would be implemented (the option marked by the 
yellow frame). If the receiver did not believe (D), both the receiver and the sender would 
earn 0€. (Charity_HonCon_Lie: lying in the condition with honesty concerns to get higher 
payoffs and with a charity as the beneficiary; Self_HonCon_Lie: lying in the condition 
with honesty concerns to get higher payoffs and with participants as the beneficiary.) 
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  Table 6.1 
 
6.2.4. Procedure 
Before the fMRI experiment, all participants read a brief introduction about 6 
charitable organizations (i.e., Doctors without Borders, World Wide Fund for Nature, 
Greenpeace, Amnesty International, German World Hunger Aid, and The United 
Nations Children’s Emergency Fund) and selected one organization to be the 
beneficiary as was done previously (Kuss et al., 2013). They read the instructions of 
the experiment and completed a manipulation check. Every participant signed a 
consent form to authorize the experimenters to donate the money (i.e., the sender’s 
payoff in one randomly selected charity-profit trial) to the pre-selected charity. 
Participants were informed that they would play the game with an anonymous 
receiver, and neither of them would know the identity of the other. They would not 
meet the receiver during the whole experiment. Only the initials of participants would 
be presented to the receiver. Unknown to the participants, the receiver in the 
experiment was a confederate and chose to believe all messages. 
The payoff structure in Study 2 
               Low 
 
       High 
 
PD 
2 6 10 
1 3 7 11 
4 6* 10* 14* 
6 8* 12* 16* 
8 10* 14* 18* 
15 17 21 25 
Low: low payoffs for the sender; High: high payoffs for the 
sender.  
PD: the payoff difference between the high payoff and the low 
payoff for the sender. 
The combination marked by * repeated four times in each 
condition and others repeated twice in each condition. 
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In the scanner, to get familiar with the experiment, participants first completed a 
practice session, which included eight simulated trials. After the practice, participants 
entered the scanner and made a series of decisions to phrase messages. After the 
fMRI experiment, one trial from the charity-profit condition and one trial from the 
self-profit condition would be randomly chosen. Participants were finally informed of 
the total payoff (i.e., 10€ participation fee plus the payoff from the self-profit 
condition) and were paid accordingly. Money was donated to the corresponding 
charitable organizations according to participants’ choices in the selected charity-
profit trials. 
6.2.5. Data acquisition 
Participants’ responses in the scanner were collected via an MRI-compatible response 
device (NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway). All images were acquired on a Siemens 
Trio 3.0-Tesla scanner with a standard 32-channel head coil. Structural scans 
included T1-weighted images (TR = 1660 ms; TE = 2.75 ms; flip angle = 9°; slice 
thickness = 0.8 mm). The functional scans were acquired using T2*-weighted echo 
planar images (EPI) pulse sequence employing a BOLD contrast (flip angle = 90°; TR 
= 2500 ms; TE = 30 ms; 96 × 96 acquisition matrix; field of view =192 × 192 mm2; 37 
slices; in-plane resolution = 2 × 2 mm2, thickness = 3 mm).  
6.2.6. Data analyses 
Data from five subjects were excluded, due to the following reasons: two for excessive 
head movements (i.e., > 3 mm or 3° of rotation), two for technical failure during 
scanning, and one due to a misunderstanding of the experiment. All following 
analyses were based on the data of remaining 42 participants (26 females; mean ± s.d. 
age = 25.45 ± 3.43 years ranged from 19 to 33 years). 
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6.2.6.1. Behavioral data analyses 
Statistical analyses of percentages and reaction times were conducted with SPSS 22.0 
(IBM Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA). Two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were 
performed. All P values were two-tailed, and P < 0.05 was considered statistically 
significant. 
Measure of the impact of altruistic goals on honesty concerns 
The effects of honesty concerns in the charity-profit and the self-profit conditions 
were estimated by the ratios of payoff loss caused by honesty concerns. The higher the 
effect of honesty concerns, the higher the ratio of payoff loss. To estimate the impact 
of altruistic outcomes on honesty concerns, the ratios of payoff loss in the self-profit 
and the charity-profit conditions would be compared. If altruistic outcomes reduce 
honesty concerns to a greater extent, the difference in the payoff loss ratios between 
the self-profit and the charity-profit condition would be larger. 
In Gneezy’s experiment (2005), the rates of choosing advantageous allocations in the 
deception game and the rates in the the dictator game were compared to estimate the 
extent of lying aversion by ruling out the preferences of the payoff distribution. In 
Study 2, the NoHonCon condition was introduced as the control condition where 
participants could get higher payoffs via truth-telling. In both the HonCon and the 
NoHonCon conditions, participants could earn more by choosing the high payoff 
option to phrase a message. In the HonCon condition, however, choosing the high 
payoff option corresponds to sending an untruthful message to deceive the receiver. 
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To some extent, participants had honesty concerns in the HonCon condition.24 The 
individual who has higher honesty concerns tends to choose the high payoff option 
less often in the honesty concerns condition than the condition without honesty 
concerns, resulting in higher payoff loss. Therefore, the payoff loss in the HonCon 
condition was compared with that in the NoHonCon condition, and the ratios of the 
payoff loss caused by honesty concerns were calculated as follows: 
 
𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐿: 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
∑ (𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑁𝑜𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ − 𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝐿𝑖𝑒) ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖
5
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑁𝑜𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖
5
𝑖=1
 6.1 
 
𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐿: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓 =
∑ (𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓_𝑁𝑜𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ − 𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓_𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝐿𝑖𝑒) ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖
5
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓_𝑁𝑜𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖
5
𝑖=1
 6.2 
In the equation (6.1), 𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑁𝑜𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ denotes the numbers of truth-telling 
decisions in the trials with different payoff differences PDi (i.e., 1, 4, 6, 8, or 15) and 
with a charity as the beneficiary in the situation without honesty concerns. The 
Parameter 𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝐿𝑖𝑒 denotes the numbers of lying decisions in the trials 
with different payoff differences PDi (i.e., 1, 4, 6, 8, or 15) and with a charity as the 
beneficiary in the situation with honesty concerns. ∑ 𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝐿𝑖𝑒 ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖
5
𝑖=1  and 
∑ 𝑁𝑃𝐷𝑖_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑁𝑜𝐻𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ ∙ 𝑃𝐷𝑖
5
𝑖=1  denote the total payoff increments when 
participants chose high payoff options. Choosing high payoff options is lying in the 
HonCon condition and is truth-telling in the NoHonCon condition. The rules hold 
true for the equation (6.2) except that the beneficiaries were participants themselves 
(i.e., the self-profit condition). HCPL: Charity and HCPL: Self respectively denoted the 
                                                   
24 In Session 6.1, 6.2.2, and 6.2.3, the HonCon condition refers to the situation with honesty concerns 
to earn high payoffs, where a computer chooses the low payoff option and participants can only earn 
the high payoff by lying. The honesty concerns condition might have different impacts on different 
individuals. For example, some individuals do not have concerns regarding honesty in the HonCon 
condition and always choose higher payoffs, regardless of the means (lying in the HonCon condition or 
truth-telling in the NoHonCon condition). Therefore, honesty concerns in the experimental design 
describe the situation in which higher payoffs can be obtained by lying. The effect of honesty concerns 
estimated in every participant describes the extent to which the HonCon situation influences 
participants’ decisions.  
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ratios of the payoff loss (abbrev.: PL) caused by honesty concerns in the charity-profit 
and the self-profit conditions. Higher values of HCPL: Charity and HCPL: Self indicate 
larger ratios of payoff loss caused by honesty concerns in the charity-profit and self-
profit conditions, respectively.  
To estimate the impact of altruistic outcomes on the effect of honesty concerns, the 
difference between HCPL: Self and HCPL: Charity was calculated as follows:  
 𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐿: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓−𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐿:𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓 − 𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐿: 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 6.3 
HCPL: Self-Charity in the equation (6.3) denotes the impact of altruistic outcomes on the 
ratios of payoff loss caused by honesty concerns. If HCPL: Self-Charity = 0, the ratios of 
payoff loss caused by honesty concerns are indifferent between the charity-profit and 
the self-profit conditions. If HCPL: Self-Charity < 0, the charity-profit condition increases 
the ratios of payoff loss. If HCPL: Self-Charity > 0, the charity-profit condition decreases 
the ratios of payoff loss.  
If there was a participant who always chose high payoff options in both the 
Charity_NoHonCon condition and the Charity_HonCon condition, the equation (6.1) 
would be:  
𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐿: 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
(6−6)∙1+(12−12)∙4+(12−12)∙6+(12−12)∙8+(6−6)∙15
6∙1+12∙4+12∙6+12∙8+6∙15
= 0. 
If the same participant chose high payoff options in the Self_NoHonCon condition 
regardless of different PDs, and chose high payoff options in 100% of the 
Self_HonCon trials with the PD of 15, 50% of the Self_HonCon trials with the PD of 4, 
6, and 8, and 0% of the Self_HonCon trials with the PD of 1. The equation (6.2) would 
be: 
𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐿: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓 =
(6−0)∙1+(12−6)∙4+(12−6)∙6+(12−6)∙8+(6−6)∙15
6∙1+12∙4+12∙6+12∙8+6∙15
≈ 0.37. 
The impact of altruistic outcomes on the ratios of payoff loss caused by honesty 
concerns in this participant would be: 𝐻𝐶𝑃𝐿: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓−𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 0.37 − 0 = 0.37, meaning 
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that the charity-profit condition decreases the ratios of payoff loss caused by honesty 
concerns compared with the self-profit condition.   
6.2.6.2. Functional MRI data analyses 
SPM8 was used for fMRI data analyses (Welcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For each subject, EPI images were 
first realigned and corrected for slice timing. Data sets that exhibited movement of >3 
mm or 3° of rotation were not included. The anatomical image was co-registered to 
the mean EPI image. It was segmented, and parameters for normalization to MNI 
space were generated. EPI data were then projected onto MNI space with a 2×2×2 
mm3 resolution and smoothed using an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian filter. High-pass 
temporal filtering with a cut-off of 128s was performed to remove low-frequency drifts. 
The statistical analyses of fMRI data were based on three general linear models (i.e., 
GLMs 1-3). Based on the events of interest, trials were categorized as the following 
conditions: Charity_HonCon_Lie (lying in the condition with honesty concerns to get 
higher payoffs and with a charity as the beneficiary; Figure 6.1A), Self_HonCon_Lie 
(lying in the condition with honesty concerns to get higher payoffs and with oneself as 
the beneficiary; Figure 6.1B), Charity_NoHonCon_Truth (truth-telling in the 
condition without honesty concerns to get higher payoffs and with a charity as the 
beneficiary), Self_NoHonCon_Truth (truth-telling in the condition without honesty 
concerns to get higher payoffs and with oneself as the beneficiary), 
Charity_HonCon_Truth (truth-telling in the condition with honesty concerns and 
with a charity as the beneficiary), and Self_HonCon_Truth (truth-telling in the 
condition with honesty concerns and with oneself as the beneficiary). Given that there 
are very limited trials in the two conditions of NoHonCon_Lie (i.e., lying in the 
condition without honesty concerns to get higher payoffs; mean trials in charity-profit 
condition: 3.24; mean trials in self-profit condition: 4.98), these two conditions were 
not used in the fMRI analysis. 
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GLM 1 was set up to investigate whether lying and truth-telling to get higher payoffs 
are encoded differently in the charity-profit and the self-profit conditions, as well as 
the neural correlates that reflect individual differences in the impact of altruistic goals 
on honesty concerns. Four regressors of interest were included, which contained the 
onsets of four events: (1) Charity_HonCon_Lie, (2) Charity_NoHonCon_Truth, (3) 
Self_HonCon_Lie, and (4) Self_NoHonCon_Truth. In addition, one parametric 
modulator of payoff differences was added for each regressor respectively to remove 
the confounding effects that might be driven by 1) advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequality situations (Hsu et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2014) and 2) the payoff differences 
between the low payoff and the high payoff for the sender. Onsets of the other events 
(i.e., trials with no response and trials with decisions that lead to low payoff outcomes 
to senders) were combined into one regressor of no interest (i.e., other regressor). Six 
estimated head motion parameters were also included in the GLM to remove the 
effects of head motion.  
In the group-level analyses of GLM 1, paired t-tests were conducted on the contrasts 
of Self_HonCon_Lie versus Charity_HonCon_Lie and Self_NoHonCon_Truth versus 
Charity_NoHonCon_Truth. The contrast of Self_HonCon_Lie versus 
Charity_HonCon_Lie corresponds to the altruistic impact on the decision to lie. The 
contrast of Self_NoHonCon_Truth versus Charity_NoHonCon_Truth corresponds to 
the altruistic impact on the decision to tell the truth in the control condition. To 
investigate the neural representation of individual differences in the altruistic impact 
on lying, the estimated altruistic impact on honesty concerns of each participant (i.e., 
HCPL: Self-Charity) was entered into a group-level regression analysis examining the 
neural response of altruistic impact on lying (Self_HonCon_Lie versus 
Charity_HonCon_Lie). In GLM 1, due to insufficient trials (<5) in at least one of the 
regressors of interest, data from 5 participants were removed from the analysis and 
data from the remaining 37 participants were analyzed. 
In GLM 1, payoff differences between the condition without honesty concerns and the 
condition with honesty concerns might cause confounds. To further control the payoff 
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differences between the two conditions, GLM 2 was applied. Similar to GLM 1, four 
regressors of interest were defined. More importantly, trials with unbalanced payoffs 
in the HonCon_Lie and NoHonCon_Truth were excluded. In other words, the 
included HonCon_Lie and NoHonCon_Truth trials have identical payoff structures 
and the same final payoffs within self-profit and charity-profit conditions for each 
participant. The onsets of the other events (i.e., trials with no response, trials with 
decisions that lead to low payoff outcomes to senders, and trials with unbalanced 
payoff structures) were combined into one other regressor. Parametric modulators of 
payoff differences were added to those four regressors of interest. Six estimated head 
motion parameters were also included in the GLM 2 to remove the effects of head 
motion. 
In the group-level analyses of GLM 2, to check if the findings from GLM 1 can be 
replicated, the same paired t-tests were conducted on the contrasts of 
Self_HonCon_Lie versus Charity_HonCon_Lie and Self_NoHonCon_Truth versus 
Charity_NoHonCon_Truth at the group level. To further investigate whether there is 
a significant correlation between behavioral and neural altruistic impact on honesty 
concerns after payoff differences were controlled, the estimated altruistic impact on 
honesty concerns for each participant (i.e., HCPL: Self-Charity) was entered into a group-
level regression analysis examining the neural response of altruistic impact on lying 
(i.e., (Self_HonCon_Lie –Self_NoHonCon_Truth) versus (Charity_HonCon_Lie – 
Charity_NoHonCon_Truth)). In GLM 2, data from one participant were excluded 
due to insufficient trials (< 5) after balancing payoff differences between HonCon_Lie 
and NoHonCon_Truth in both the charity-profit condition and the self-profit 
condition. Therefore, data from 36 participants were included. 
In GLM 1 and GLM 2, truth-telling in the condition without honesty concerns was 
used as a control condition/decision. However, truth-telling in the condition with 
honesty concerns might contain the process of refraining from dishonest gain. The 
altruistic impact on the truth-telling in the condition with honesty concerns might be 
different. Therefore, GLM 3 was applied to investigate the neural basis of the altruistic 
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impact on both lying and truth-telling in the condition with honesty concerns. Four 
regressors of interest were defined in GLM 3, namely the onsets of: (1) 
Charity_HonCon_Lie, (2) Charity_HonCon_Truth, (3) Self_HonCon_Lie, and (4) 
Self_HonCon_Truth. The onsets of the other events (i.e., trials with no response and 
trials without honesty concerns) were regarded as variables of no interest and 
combined into one other regressor. Those four regressors of interest were 
parametrically modulated by the payoff differences between the high payoff and the 
low payoff for the sender. In the group-level analyses, paired t-tests were conducted 
on the contrasts of Self_HonCon_Lie versus Charity_HonCon_Lie and 
Self_HonCon_Truth versus Charity_HonCon_Truth at the group level. In GLM 3, 
only 23 participants had sufficient trials (> 5) in each condition of interest and data 
from 23 participants were included. 
Given the important role of the anterior insula in individual differences in lying 
behavior (Baumgartner et al., 2013) and in avoiding a loss to a charity (Greening et al., 
2014), regression analyses were performed with a priori region of interest (ROI) on 
the bilateral AI. The ROIs were defined by applying the restriction of y > 0 (MNI 
coordinate) to the left and the right insula anatomical masks, which were defined via 
Wake Forest University Pickatlas toolbox (Maldjian et al., 2003). Results were 
considered significant if they survived the threshold of cluster- or voxel-level P < 0.05, 
family-wise error (FWE) corrected within the defined region of interest in the AI (i.e., 
small volume correction). For other analyses, if there is no additional statement, 
regions were considered significant if they passed the whole-brain cluster FWE 
correction at P < 0.05, with an uncorrected voxel-level cluster-defining threshold of P 
< 0.001 (Eklund et al., 2016). 
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6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Behavioral results 
Participants lied more often to get higher payoffs for charitable organizations 
(Charity_HonCon; mean ± s.d.: 61.94% ± 32.27) than for themselves (Self_HonCon; 
mean ± s.d: 55.08% ± 31.42) (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, P = 0.02; N = 42). 
The difference in the percentages of choosing higher payoffs between the 
Charity_NoHonCon condition (mean ± s.d: 93.03% ± 15.84) and the Self_NoHonCon 
condition (mean ± s.d: 89.38% ± 18.16) was marginally significant (two-sided 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, P = 0.08).  
The results hold true in the sample of 37 participants whose data were used in GLM 1 
(Figure 6.2). They lied more often to get higher payoffs for charitable organizations 
than for themselves (Charity_HonCon: 69.06% ± 27.10; Self_HonCon: 61.56% ± 
27.28; two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, P = 0.02). The difference in the 
percentages of choosing higher payoffs between two conditions without honesty 
concerns was marginally significant (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, P = 0.06; 
Charity_NoHonCon: 92.14% ± 16.70; Self_NoHonCon: 88.00% ± 18.95). 
The means and the standard deviations of reaction times in four conditions in 37 
participants whose data were used in fMRI data analyses (GLM 1) are listed in Table 
6.2. The difference in reaction times between the Self_HonCon_Lie and the 
Charity_HonCon_Lie conditions was marginally significant (two-sided Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, P = 0.09). Participants were significantly faster when telling the 
truth in the Self_NoHonCon condition than when they were telling the truth in the 
Charity_NoHonCon condition (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, P = 0.006). 
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Figure 6.2: The behavioral results in Study 2. The percentages of choosing higher payoffs 
in four conditions (Charity_HonCon, Self_HonCon, Charity_NoHonCon, and 
Self_NoHonCon) are shown. The condition with honesty concerns refers to the concerns 
of earning higher payoffs through lying (marked in light yellow; HonCon). The condition 
without honesty concerns refers to the absence of the concerns of earning higher payoffs 
through lying (marked in light blue; NoHonCon). (* P < 0.05; n.s.: not significant; N = 37; 
error bars: s.e.m.) 
 
Table 6.2 
 
 
 
 
Reaction time data in Study 2 (ms; N = 37) 
Beneficiary 
Mean (s.d.) 
HonCon_Lie NoHonCon_Truth 
Charity 1577 (531) 1367 (414) 
Self 1538 (531) 1312 (419) 
HonCon_Lie:  lying in the conditions with honesty concerns 
NoHonCon_Truth: truth-telling in the conditions without honesty 
concerns 
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6.3.2. Functional MRI results 
In GLM 1, the contrast corresponding to the altruistic impact on lying (i.e., 
Self_HonCon_Lie versus Charity_HonCon_Lie) showed significant activation in the 
right AI (Figure 6.3; Table 6.3). The left AI was also activated under a more lenient 
threshold of P < 0.001 uncorrected (k = 88; MNI coordinate of the peak voxel: -28, 20, 
-8). No significant results were observed in the opposite contrast. No significant 
results were observed in the contrast corresponding to the altruistic impact on truth-
telling in the control condition (i.e., Self_NoHonCon_Truth versus 
Charity_NoHonCon_Truth), even with a lenient threshold (i.e., uncorrected voxel-
level threshold of P < 0.005). The results of regression analyses showed significant 
positive correlations (small volume correction, PFWE-corrected < 0.05) between the 
altruistic impact on activity in the left and right AI (MNI coordinate of the peak voxel: 
-28, 12, -12; 32, 24, 6; Self_HonCon_Lie versus Charity_HonCon_Lie) and the 
estimated altruistic impact on honesty concerns (i.e., HCPL: Self-Charity). 
 
Figure 6.3: fMRI results of GLM 1 in Study 2. The results of the contrast of 
Self_HonCon_Lie versus Charity_HonCon_Lie are shown (N = 37). (A) Significant 
activation was observed in the right AI. (B) Parameter estimates were extracted from the 
whole activated cluster in the right AI in the Charity_HonCon_Lie and the 
Self_HonCon_Lie conditions. (HonCon_Lie: lying in the conditions with honesty concerns; 
AI: anterior insula; error bars: s.e.m.) 
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In GLM 2, after controlling for payoff differences, the altruistic impact on lying was 
related to activity in the right AI (Self_HonCon_Lie versus Charity_HonCon_Lie) 
under a lenient threshold (MNI coordinate of the peak voxel: 36, 24, -4; voxel-level P 
< 0.001 uncorrected and k = 133). No significant activation in the AI was observed in 
the opposite contrast. No significant results were observed in the comparison between 
Self_NoHonCon_Truth versus Charity_NoHonCon_Truth. Significant positive 
correlations (small volume correction, PFWE-corrected < 0.05) were also observed 
between the altruistic impact on lying-specific activity in the left and right AI (MNI 
coordinate of the peak voxel: -36, 18, 2; 34, 20, 4; (Self_HonCon_Lie –
Self_NoHonCon_Truth) versus (Charity_HonCon_Lie – 
Charity_NoHonCon_Truth)) and the estimated altruistic impact on honesty concerns 
(HCPL: Self-Charity; Figure 6.4). 
Table 6.3 
fMRI results of GLM 1 in Study 2 (N = 37) 
Brain area L/R Voxel 
MNI 
coordinates T value 
x y z 
Charity_HonCon_Lie > Self_HonCon_Lie 
        None 
      Self_HonCon_Lie > Charity_HonCon_Lie 
        Anterior insula R 247 36 24 -4 4.66 
Charity_NoHonCon_Truth > Self_NoHonCon_Truth 
        None       
Self_NoHonCon_Truth > Charity_NoHonCon_Truth 
        None       
Voxel-level threshold P < 0.001 uncorrected, cluster-level PFWE-corrected < 0.05. 
Charity_HonCon_Lie: lying in the condition with honesty concerns and with a 
charity as the beneficiary. 
Self_HonCon_Lie: lying in the condition with honesty concerns and with participants 
as the beneficiary. 
Charity_NoHonCon_Truth: truth-telling in the condition without honesty concerns 
and with a charity as the beneficiary. 
Self_NoHonCon_Truth: truth-telling in the condition without honesty concerns and 
with participants as the beneficiary. 
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Figure 6.4: fMRI results of GLM 2 in Study 2. The neuroimaging results of the impact of 
altruistic outcomes on honesty concerns are shown (N = 36). Neural activity in the left and 
the right AI in the contrast of (Self_HonCon_Lie –Self_NoHonCon_Truth) versus 
(Charity_HonCon_Lie – Charity_NoHonCon_Truth) positively correlated with HCPL: Self-
Charity. All effects were significant after small volume correction (PFWE-corrected < 0.05). For 
illustration purpose, activations in the AI are displayed at uncorrected significance 
threshold (P < 0.005, k > 100). (AI: anterior insula; HCPL: Self-Charity: the difference in the 
ratio of the payoff loss caused by honesty concerns between the self-profit condition and 
the charity-profit condition) 
 
In GLM 3, similar to previous findings in GLM 1 and GLM 2, significant activation in 
the right AI was observed in the contrast of Self_HonCon_Lie versus 
Charity_HonCon_Lie (Figure 6.5A; Table 6.4). Truth-telling to refrain from 
dishonest gain for charitable organizations elicited higher activity in the ventral 
medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) than truth-telling to refrain from dishonest gain 
for participants themselves (Charity_HonCon_Truth versus Self_HonCon_Truth; 
Figure 6.5B; Table 6.4). No significant results were observed in the opposite contrasts 
(Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.4 
6.4. Discussion 
A modified sender-receiver game was used in Study 2 to investigate how altruistic 
outcomes modulate lying behaviors and the underlying neural processes from the 
perspective of the communicators. The altruistic outcome was introduced by 
including charitable benefits in the decision-making process. In the charity-profit 
condition, lies could benefit a charity, whereas in the self-profit condition lies could 
only benefit the communicator. In the control conditions, participants could achieve 
greater benefits for a charity or themselves by telling the truth. Consistent with 
previous behavioral findings (Lewis et al., 2012), the behavioral results in Study 2 
showed that participants lied more often to earn a higher payoff for a charity than for 
themselves. 
fMRI results of GLM 3 in Study 2 (N = 23) 
Brain area L/M/R Voxel 
MNI 
coordinates T value 
x y z 
Charity_HonCon_Lie > Self_HonCon_Lie 
        None 
      Self_HonCon_Lie > Charity_HonCon_Lie 
        Anterior insula R 273 34 24 -6 5.31 
Charity_HonCon_Truth > Self_HonCon_Truth 
        Ventral medial prefrontal cortex M 202 -2 42 -18 4.73 
Self_HonCon_Truth > Charity_HonCon_Truth 
        None       
Voxel-level threshold P < 0.001 uncorrected, cluster-level PFWE-corrected < 0.05. 
Charity_HonCon_Lie: lying in the condition with honesty concerns and with a charity as 
the beneficiary. 
Self_HonCon_Lie: lying in the condition with honesty concerns and with participants as 
the beneficiary. 
Charity_HonCon_Truth: truth-telling in the condition with honesty concerns and with a 
charity as the beneficiary. 
Self_HonCon_Truth: truth-telling in the condition with honesty concerns and with 
participants as the beneficiary. 
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Figure 6.5: fMRI results of GLM 3 in Study 2 (N = 23). (A) The results of the contrast of 
Self_HonCon_Lie versus Charity_HonCon_Lie are shown. Significant activation was 
observed in the right AI. Parameter estimates were extracted from the whole activated 
cluster in the right AI in the Charity_HonCon_Lie and the Self_HonCon_Lie conditions. 
(B) The results of the contrast of Charity_HonCon_Truth versus Self_HonCon_Truth are 
shown. Significant activation was observed in the VMPFC. Parameter estimates were 
extracted from the whole activated cluster in the VMPFC in the Charity_HonCon_Truth 
and the Self_HonCon_Truth conditions. (Self_HonCon_Lie: lying in the conditions with 
honesty concerns and with participants as the beneficiary; Charity_HonCon_Lie: lying in 
the conditions with honesty concerns and with a charity as the beneficiary; 
Self_HonCon_Truth: truth-telling in the conditions with honesty concerns and with 
participants as the beneficiary; Charity_HonCon_Truth: truth-telling in the conditions 
with honesty concerns and with a charity as the beneficiary; AI: anterior insula; VMPFC: 
ventral medial prefrontal cortex; error bars: s.e.m.) 
Experimental section 
70 
 
At the neural level, the results in GLM 1 showed that lying for a charity reduced AI 
activity compared with lying for oneself. The AI is one of the key regions associated 
with deception (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Christ et al., 2009; Baumgartner et al., 
2013; Farah et al., 2014; Lisofsky et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2015a; Volz et al., 2015). In 
addition to deception, the insula signals negative emotional states (Calder et al., 2000) 
or aversive emotional experiences, such as the experience of unfairness (Sanfey et al., 
2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008) and the threat of punishment (Spitzer et al., 2007). The 
consistent findings on the involvement of the AI in deceptive decision-making might 
be due to the negative emotional response to lying.  
In an fMRI study of charitable donations, decisions to oppose donations to charities 
were associated with activity in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the AI (Moll et al., 
2006), suggesting a role for the AI in mediating aversive experiences (Moll et al., 
2008). In a study investigating the neural response to aversive drinks that were 
intentionally delivered by others, participants felt more angry toward the intentional 
aversive conditions and their AI activity correlated with the interaction between the 
perceived intentionality and anticipated outcome valence (Liljeholm et al., 2014). 
Given that the AI is sensitive to aversive social interactions (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011) 
and the interference of intentionality, reduced AI activity observed when participants 
lied for a charity in Study 2 might be caused by the process in which altruistic 
outcomes modulated the negative affective states when participants chose to lie. 
In a recent resting EEG study, people with the higher neural baseline activation in the 
AI had a lower propensity to deceive (Baumgartner et al., 2013), suggesting a 
potential link between the AI and individual differences in the reluctance to lying. In 
Study 2, participants whose concerns regarding honesty were more strongly 
decreased by the altruistic outcomes (i.e., with larger HCPL: Self-Charity) showed greater 
reductions in lying-specific activity in the bilateral AI in the charity-profit condition. 
The result further supports the hypothesis that the anterior insula signals the aversive 
emotional responses to lying, which can further be modulated by the outcomes (self-
profit or altruistic outcomes). In a study of charitable decision-making, increased 
Discussion 
71 
 
connectivity between the VMPFC and the bilateral AI was observed in the free and 
forced donation, suggesting that the AI encodes social values of donation (Hare et al., 
2010). A recent study of social exclusion showed that the bilateral AI was activated 
when participants observed others being excluded, whereas participants with stronger 
neural activity in the right AI in response to other’s social pain behaved in a more 
prosocial manner toward the victims (Masten et al., 2011). Given the above findings 
and the role of AI in empathy (Singer et al., 2004b; Jackson et al., 2005; Lamm et al., 
2011), a precursor of altruistic behavior (Singer and Lamm, 2009), the right AI might 
code for the modulation of altruistic outcomes when making aversive decisions.  
Intriguingly, the involvement of the DLPFC was not observed in Study 2. The DLPFC 
activation was observed in tasks that require high level of cognitive control (Sanfey et 
al., 2003; Aron et al., 2004; Spitzer et al., 2007), particularly in deceptive decision-
making tasks (Lee et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2005; Luan Phan et al., 2005; Nunez et al., 
2005; Abe et al., 2006; Abe et al., 2007; Karton and Bachmann, 2011; Karton et al., 
2014). Zhu et al.  (2014) found that the DLPFC lesioned patients showed reduced 
honesty concerns in the sender-receiver game. However, the concerns for receivers’ 
payoffs and the confounding truth-telling behaviors (i.e., sophisticated deception) 
were controlled for in Study 2. It is possible that the cognitive resources required in 
the self-profit and charity-profit conditions when people are making deceptive 
decisions are similar. The altruistic goals might modulate honesty concerns by 
influencing the affective processing via the AI, rather than by affecting the cognitive 
control via the DLPFC. 
When participants decided to tell the truth and reduce payoffs for a charity, activity in 
the VMPFC was significantly higher than when they decided to tell the truth and 
reduce payoffs for themselves. In a previous study, participants were more likely to 
donate to a charity with a high subjective value and the VMPFC was involved in 
computing the value of charitable donations (Hare et al., 2010). Moreover, VMPFC 
activation was observed in the comparison between costly decisions (either costly 
donations or costly opposition to donations)  and pure monetary rewards (Moll et al., 
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2006). In Study 2, participants chose a preferable charitable organization to be the 
beneficiary of their decisions before the fMRI experiment. VMPFC activation 
observed here might not reflect the values of different charitable organizations, but 
the VMPFC might be involved in the process of sacrificing social rewards to avoid the 
psychological costs of lying. 
6.5. Limitations 
The association between the AI and lying aversion might suffer the problem of reverse 
inference (i.e., inferring a cognitive process from neuroimaging data) (Poldrack, 
2006). Trust in the reverse inference can be enhanced by additional measures such as 
measures of mood (Fehr, 2009). However, in Study 2, participants were not asked to 
report emotional valences. Nevertheless, the measurement of lying frequency and the 
estimated altruistic impact on honesty concerns support the speculation that 
participants were generally less reluctant and averse to lie for a charity.  
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7. Study 3: The neural mechanisms underlying the 
modulation of altruistic outcomes on recipients’ process 
of deception  
The associated work has been published in Yin Lijun and Weber Bernd (2016). Can 
beneficial ends justify lying? Neural responses to the passive reception of lies and 
truth-telling with beneficial and harmful monetary outcomes. Social Cognitive and 
Affective Neuroscience (11), 423-432. 
Author contributions: L.Y. and B.W. designed research; L.Y. performed research; 
L.Y. analyzed data; L.Y. and B.W. wrote the paper. 
7.1. Introduction 
The modulation of altruistic outcomes on communicators’ process of deception was 
investigated in Study 2. The next question is about the altruistic impact on the 
recipients’ neural process of deception. By showing participants the scenarios that 
contain different social contexts and by asking them to provide moral judgments in 
the scanner, researchers could investigate the neural correlates of evaluations of lying 
and truth-telling (Berthoz et al., 2006; Hayashi et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2011; Hayashi 
et al., 2014). However, three limitations exist if the method is used to investigate the 
proposed research question. First, participants’ affective or emotional responses to 
the scenarios might be interrupted if they are asked to provide moral judgments 
during the experiment (Knutson et al., 2014). Second, making judgments about a 
given scenario from a third-party perspective might involve rational processing  (Wu 
et al., 2011) and is less emotionally arousing. The rational process might further 
induce greater involvement of the prefrontal cortex (Abe et al., 2014; Hayashi et al., 
2014). Finally, different neural correlates are involved in situations where oneself or 
Experimental section 
74 
 
others are deceived. For example, the amygdala was activated when participants 
judged themselves as being deceived compared with the judgments about others being 
deceived, participants deceiving the experimenter, and others deceiving the 
experimenter (Grezes et al., 2006). 
Considering the confounds and personal involvement, a modified sender-receiver 
game (Erat and Gneezy, 2012) was used in Study 3 to investigate the neural processes 
underlying lies from the perspectives of the recipients. In this game, participants were 
the direct recipients of lies and truth, with different monetary outcomes. Participants 
acting as receivers first read the messages, which were sent by multiple senders, 
regarding the results of a die roll representing one of the payoff options. They then 
decided whether to believe the message or not. If participants did not believe the 
messages, both players received the minimum payoffs. If participants believed 
senders’ messages, they would face four different conditions: the beneficial lies 
condition: senders sent untruthful messages and both players earned more money 
compared to the alternative options; the harmful lies condition: senders sent 
untruthful messages and the senders earned more money but participants earned less 
money; the beneficial truth condition: senders sent truthful messages and both 
players earned more money; and the harmful truth condition: senders sent truthful 
messages and the senders earned more money but participants earned less money. 
After the fMRI experiment, an explicit moral judgment task was used to measure 
participants’ judgments about the moral acceptance of the different conditions. 
7.2. Materials and methods 
7.2.1. Participants 
Forty-one participants (23 females; mean ± s.d. age = 24.15 ± 3.14 years ranged from 
19 to 32 years) were invited to take part in the fMRI experiment and play the game as 
receivers. All participants reported no prior history of psychiatric or neurological 
Materials and methods 
75 
 
disorders and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants provided 
their informed consent. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
University of Bonn.  
7.2.2. Tasks 
A modified sender-receiver game (Figure 7.1) was used. In every trial, there were two 
payoff options. Each consisted of the payoff for a sender (represented by the blue bar) 
and the payoff for a receiver (represented by the red bar). The outcome of a die roll 
represented one of two payoff options (indexed by the icon of a die). The senders 
chose one of six numbers to phrase a message: “The outcome of the die roll is x” 
(where x = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6). The senders could either send an untruthful message 
(Figure 7.1A) or a truthful message (Figure 7.1B) to the receivers.  
In the scanner, participants as the message receivers first saw the message which 
indicated the outcome of the die roll and the initials of the associated sender. On the 
same screen, participants made the decision to believe (i.e., choosing “Yes”) or not to 
believe (i.e., choosing “No”) the sender’s message by pressing the respective button on 
the response grips. The positions of “Yes” and “No” options were counterbalanced 
within each participant. After pressing the button on the response grips, a yellow 
frame appeared and indexed the corresponding choice for 0.5s. A fixation cross was 
then displayed for a jittered interval (4-6s). If participants believed the sender’s 
message, the next screen displayed the two payoff options and the actual outcome of 
the die roll for 5s. Participants could find out that the sender lied or told the truth. If 
the message was untruthful, the alternative option would be implemented (Figure 
7.1C). Otherwise, the payoff option represented by the die would be implemented 
(Figure 7.1D). The yellow frame indexed the final implemented payoff option. If 
participants did not believe, both sides of the players earned a minimum payoff (i.e., 
1€; Figure 7.1E).  
In the original sender-receiver game from the study by Erat and Gneezy (2012), if 
participants chose the actual outcome of a die roll, the option represented by the die 
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would be implemented. Otherwise, the alternative option would be implemented. 
When participants were making decisions in the original sender-receiver game, extra 
cognitive processes of generating strategies or emotional responses toward bad 
choices might be involved. These might influence participants’ neural evaluations of 
senders’ behaviors. To avoid these confounding factors, in the task of Study 3, if a 
receiver did not believe the sender’s message, both sides of the players earned a 
minimum payoff.  
7.2.3. Design and stimuli 
The current event-related fMRI study adopted a 2 (mean: lies or truth) by 2 (outcome: 
beneficial or harmful outcomes) within-subject design. One 40-min scanning run 
contained 144 trials in total (36 trials per condition). Before the fMRI experiment, 86 
participants were invited to play the game online as senders. They made decisions in 
144 trials and earned 5€ for their participation. Their messages were pre-selected to 
phrase messages for all four conditions in the fMRI experiment, and the initials of the 
senders would not repeat more than three times. The payoff structure is shown in 
Table 7.1. The final payoff for both the sender and the receiver was one of three 
monetary amounts (4€, 8€, or 12€). The alternative payoff for the sender was 
decreased by 25% or 75% compared to the payoff in the implemented option. The 
alternative payoff for the receiver was increased or decreased by 25% or 75% 
compared to the payoff in the implemented option. 
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Figure 7.1: The experimental paradigm of the modified sender-receiver game in Study 3. 
(A) The outcome of the die roll represented one of the payoff options (e.g., “5” 
represented the payoff option on the right, i.e., 6€ for a receiver and 3€ for a sender). A 
sender (e.g., L.Y.) sent a message to a receiver (e.g., the untruthful message of “The 
outcome of the die roll is 1”). (B) The outcome of the die roll represented the payoff 
option on the left (8€ for a receiver and 12€ for a sender). The sender sent a truthful 
message of “The outcome of the die roll is 5.” (C) In the scanner, if a participant believed 
the sender’s untruthful message, the alternative payoff option would be implemented (the 
option within the yellow outlined frame). (D) If the participant believed the sender’s 
truthful message, the payment option represented by the die would be implemented. (E) If 
the participant did not believe, both the participant and the sender earned 1€. 
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7.2.4. Procedure 
Before scanning, fMRI participants (i.e., receivers) completed a questionnaire to 
ensure that they fully understood the experiment. The senders and the receivers were 
told that their identity remained confidential to the opponents, and the initials of the 
senders would be displayed to the receivers. Participants were informed that the 
senders knew all information before they sent the messages, including the two payoff 
options and the results of the die rolls. In the scanner, participants received the 
messages and made their decisions to believe or not. 
After the fMRI experiment, participants were asked to rate emotional valences of four 
experimental conditions according to Lang’s Self-Assessment-Manikin Valence Scale 
(Lang, 1980). The nine-level Self-Assessment Manikin valence scale (1 = very 
unhappy, 5 = neutral, 9 = very happy) was adapted from PXLab (Irtel, 2008). They 
were also asked to rate moral acceptance of four conditions according to a nine-level 
scale (1 = not morally acceptable at all, 5 = neutral, 9 = extremely morally acceptable). 
One of the trials was randomly selected. The senders and the receivers were paid 
accordingly. In addition to the payoffs from the game, the receivers earned an extra 
10€ for their participation in the fMRI experiment. 
7.2.5. Data acquisition 
Participants’ responses in the scanner were collected via an MRI-compatible response 
device (NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway). All images were acquired on a Siemens 
Trio 3.0-Tesla scanner with a standard 32-channel head coil. Structural scans 
included T1-weighted images (TR = 1660 ms; TE = 2.75 ms; flip angle = 9°; slice 
thickness = 0.8 mm). One functional session was run, starting with a localizer scan, 
and was then followed by the paradigm implemented in Presentation 
(Neurobehavioral Systems; http://www.neurobs.com) during which T2*-weighted 
echo planar images were collected (flip angle = 90°; TR = 2500 ms; TE = 30 ms; 96 × 
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96 acquisition matrix; field of view =192 mm × 192 mm; 37 slices; in-plane resolution 
= 2 × 2 mm2, thickness = 3 mm). 
Table 7.1 
 
7.2.6. Data analyses 
Data from three subjects were excluded due to excessive head movements (i.e., > 3 
mm or 3° of rotation). The data from the remaining 38 participants (22 females; mean 
± s.d = 24 ± 3.24 years ranged from 19 to 32 years) were analyzed. 
7.2.6.1. Behavioral analyses 
Statistical analyses of ratings of emotional valences and moral acceptance were 
conducted with SPSS 22.0 (IBM Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA). Repeated-measure 
The payoff structure in Study 3 
                         Ratios 
                             S/R 
Alternatives 
           S/R 
 
 Final payoffs S/R 
Beneficial condition Harmful condition 
-25%/ 
-25% 
-75%/ 
-75% 
-75%/ 
-25% 
-25%/ 
-75% 
-25%/ 
+25% 
-75%/ 
+75% 
-75%/ 
+25% 
-25%/ 
+75% 
4/4 3/3 1/1 1/3 3/1 3/5 1/7 1/5 3/7 
8/4 6/3 2/1 2/3 6/1 6/5 2/7 2/5 6/7 
12/4 9/3 3/1 3/3 9/1 9/5 3/7 3/5 9/7 
4/8 3/6 1/2 1/6 3/2 3/10 1/14 1/10 3/14 
8/8 6/6 2/2 2/6 6/2 6/10 2/14 2/10 6/14 
12/8 9/6 3/2 3/6 9/2 9/10 3/14 3/10 9/14 
4/12 3/9 1/3 1/9 3/3 3/15 1/21 1/15 3/21 
8/12 6/9 2/3 2/9 6/3 6/15 2/21 2/15 6/21 
12/12 9/9 3/3 3/9 9/3 9/15 3/21 3/15 9/21 
S: Sender; R: Receiver.  
Negative ratio: the alternative payoff was decreased compared to the final payoff (beneficial 
conditions). 
Positive ratio: the alternative payoff was increased compared to the final payoff (harmful 
conditions). 
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analysis of variance (ANOVA) models were performed. All reported P values were 
two-tailed, and P < 0.05 was considered statistically significant. Post hoc analysis 
with Bonferroni correction was applied for significant interaction effects if any. 
7.2.6.2. Functional MRI data analyses 
SPM8 was adopted for fMRI data analyses (Welcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For each participant, 
EPI images were first realigned and resliced. The anatomical image was then co-
registered with the mean EPI image of each participant which was further segmented. 
The SPM8’s DARTEL tool was used to create a template and normalize functional and 
anatomical scans to the MNI template. Finally, the normalized functional images were 
smoothed by an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian filter. High-pass temporal filtering with a 
cut-off of 128s was performed to remove low-frequency drifts.  
Based on the events of interest, trials were categorized as the following conditions: 
beneficial lies (the untruthful messages that made the receiver earn more money; 
Figure 7.1C), beneficial truth (the truthful messages that made the receiver earn more 
money; Figure 7.1D), harmful lies (the untruthful messages that made the receiver 
earn less money), and harmful truth (the truthful messages that made the receiver 
earn less money). Statistical analyses of fMRI data were estimated using a general 
linear model (GLM). The regressors of interest included the onsets of the outcome 
phases in the following conditions: (1) beneficial lies, (2) beneficial truth, (3) harmful 
lies, and (4) harmful truth. Onsets of the other events (i.e., the decision phases, trials 
with no response, and trials in which participants did not believe senders’ messages; 
Figure 7.1E) were combined into one other regressor of no interest. Six estimated 
head motion parameters were also included in the GLM to account for the residual 
effects of head motion.  
In the group-level analyses, a flexible factorial model with two within-group factors 
(outcome (beneficial or harmful outcomes) and mean (lying or truth-telling)) was 
performed. If there is no additional statement, regions were considered significant if 
Results 
81 
 
they passed the whole-brain cluster FWE correction at P < 0.05, with an uncorrected 
voxel-level cluster-defining threshold of P < 0.001 (Eklund et al., 2016). Given the 
important role of the amygdala in judgments of deceit (Grezes et al., 2006), 
interaction analyses were performed with a priori region of interest (ROI) on the 
amygdala. The ROIs were defined by using the left and the right amygdala anatomical 
masks in Wake Forest University Pickatlas (WFU) toolbox (Maldjian et al., 2003). 
Results were considered significant if they survived the threshold of cluster-level P < 
0.05, family-wise error (FWE) corrected within the defined region of interest in the 
amygdala (i.e., small volume correction). 
7.3. Results 
7.3.1. Behavioral results 
The mean ratings and the standard deviations of emotional valences and moral 
acceptance are listed in Table 7.2.  
Table 7.2 
 
With respect to emotional valences, a 2 (mean: lying or truth-telling) by 2 (outcome: 
beneficial or harmful outcomes) ANOVA was performed (Figure 7.2A). The main 
effects of mean and outcome were significant (truth-telling > lying: F(1, 37) = 80.50, P < 
The behavioral ratings in Study 3 (N = 38; mean ± s.d.) 
Ratings Outcomes 
Means 
Truth Lies 
Valence 
Beneficial outcome 7.79 (1.43) 7.05 (1.73) 
Harmful outcome 5.55 (1.63) 4.24 (1.85) 
Moral 
acceptance 
Beneficial outcome 8.34 (1.12) 6.97 (2.03) 
Harmful outcome 6.61 (2.04) 4.58 (2.16) 
Valence: 1 = very unhappy, 5 = neutral, 9 = very happy. 
Moral acceptance: 1 = not morally acceptable at all, 5 = neutral, 9 = extremely morally 
acceptable. 
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0.001; beneficial outcomes > harmful outcomes: F(1, 37) = 15.59, P < 0.001). The 
interaction effect of mean × outcome was significant (F(1, 37) = 5.66, P = 0.02). The 
post hoc analysis showed that the valence difference between harmful truth and 
harmful lies was significantly higher than the valence difference between beneficial 
truth and beneficial lies (t(37) = 0.02; P = 0.02). 
With respect to moral acceptance ratings, a 2 (mean: lying or truth-telling) by 2 
(outcome: beneficial or harmful outcomes) ANOVA was performed (Figure 7.2B). The 
main effects of mean and outcome were significant (truth-telling > lying: F(1, 37) = 
75.39, P < 0.001; beneficial outcomes > harmful outcomes: F(1, 37) = 32.34, P < 0.001). 
The interaction effect of the mean and outcome showed only a trend (F(1, 37) = 1.81, P = 
0.08).  
 
 
Figure 7.2: The behavioral results in Study 3. Participants’ emotional valences (A) and 
moral acceptance ratings (B) of four conditions (beneficial truth, beneficial lies, harmful 
truth, and harmful lies) are shown (error bars: s.d.). 
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7.3.2. Functional MRI results 
The results are listed in Table 7.3. The main effect of outcome (beneficial outcomes 
versus harmful outcomes) elicited stronger activation in the bilateral NAcc (Figure 
7.3A). The opposite comparison yielded no results. The main effect of truth versus lies 
elicited stronger activation in the left NAcc (Figure 7.3B). Figure 7.4A reveals the 
overlapping region (i.e., the left NAcc; marked in yellow) that was activated in the 
main effects of benefit versus harm (marked in red) and truth versus lies (marked in 
green). The BOLD percentage signal changes were extracted from the overlapping 
region in all four conditions (Figure 7.4B).  
The main effect of mean (lies versus truth; Figure 7.5A) activated the left 
supplementary motor area (SMA), the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the right 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), and the left anterior insula (AI). The BOLD 
percentage signal changes were extracted from the SMA (Figure 7.5B), the right IFG 
(Figure 7.5C), the right STS (Figure 7.5D), and the left AI (Figure 7.5E) in all four 
conditions (i.e., beneficial truth, harmful truth, beneficial lies, and harmful lies). 
 
Figure 7.3: fMRI results in Study 3. (A) The significant main effect of beneficial 
outcomes versus harmful outcomes was observed in the bilateral NAcc. (B) The 
significant main effect of truth versus lies was observed in the left NAcc. (NAcc: nucleus 
accumbens) 
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Table 7.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fMRI results in Study 3 (N = 38) 
Brain area L/R Cluster 
MNI 
coordinates Z value 
x y z 
Truth > Lies 
       Occipital Lobe R 17215 12 -65 -3 6.50 
       Nucleus accumbens  L 374 -12 4 -10 4.20 
Lies > Truth 
       Superior temporal sulcus R 878 58 -48 12 4.51 
       Supplementary motor area L 372 -3 22 60 4.09 
       Anterior insula L 475 -36 22 9 4.08 
       Inferior frontal gyrus R 480 40 16 24 4.01 
Beneficial outcomes > Harmful outcomes 
       Nucleus accumbens R 725 12 12 -6 4.64 
       Nucleus accumbens L 386 -10 7 -7 4.34 
Harmful outcomes > Beneficial outcomes 
       None 
      (Beneficial Truth - Harmful Truth) versus (Beneficial Lies - Harmful Lies)  
       Amygdala* L 52 -17 0 -18 3.52 
(Beneficial Lies - Harmful Lies) versus (Beneficial Truth - Harmful Truth) 
       None 
      Voxel-level threshold P < 0.001, cluster-level P FWE-corrected < 0.05. 
*The effect is significant after small-volume correction for multiple 
comparisons within the amygdala ROI (PFWE-corrected < 0.05). 
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Figure 7.4: fMRI results in Study 3. (A) The overlapping region (i.e., the left NAcc; 
yellow), which was activated in the contrast of beneficial outcomes versus harmful 
outcomes (red) and the contrast of truth versus lies (green), is shown (masked with the 
NAcc anatomical mask from WFU Pickatlas Tool (Maldjian et al., 2003)). (B) Percentage 
signal changes were extracted from the overlapping region. (NAcc: nucleus accumbens; 
error bars: s.e.m.) 
 
The interaction effect of (beneficial truth – harmful truth) versus (beneficial lies - 
harmful lies) activated the left amygdala (small-volume correction, PFWE-corrected < 
0.05; Figure 7.6A). Further analyses showed that no significant differences were 
observed in the contrasts of harmful lies versus harmful truth and beneficial lies 
versus harmful lies (Ps ≥ 0.08). Significant differences were observed in the contrasts 
of beneficial truth versus beneficial lies (P < 0.001) and beneficial truth versus 
harmful truth (P = 0.02; Figure 7.6B). No significant results were observed in the 
reversed interaction effect of (beneficial lies - harmful lies) versus (beneficial truth – 
harmful truth). 
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Figure 7.5: fMRI results in Study 3. (A) The brain regions were activated in the main 
effect of lies versus truth. Percentage signal changes were extracted from the left SMA (B), 
the right IFG (C), the right STS (D), and the left AI (E). (SMA: supplementary motor area; 
IFG: inferior frontal gyrus; STS: superior temporal sulcus; AI: anterior insula; error bars: 
s.e.m.) 
 
7.4. Discussion 
The aim of Study 3 was to investigate how altruistic outcomes influence the recipients’ 
neural responses to lies and truth. The payoffs of lies and truth were manipulated to 
be more financially beneficial or harmful to participants to introduce altruistic 
outcomes and self-profit outcomes. Behaviorally, the recipients’ emotional valence 
toward lies was more negative than truth. The beneficial outcomes reduced the 
difference in the valence between truth and lies. The behavioral results suggest that 
the outcomes modulate individuals’ emotional responses to lies and truth. 
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Figure 7.6: fMRI results in Study 3. (A) The left amygdala was activated in the interaction 
effect of (beneficial truth - harmful truth) versus (beneficial lies - harmful lies) after 
small-volume correction for multiple comparisons (PFWE-corrected < 0.05). (B) Percentage 
signal changes were extracted from the left amygdala. Significant differences in brain 
activity were observed in the contrasts of beneficial truth versus harmful truth and 
beneficial truth versus beneficial lies. No significant differences were observed in the 
contrast of beneficial lies versus harmful lies and the contrast of harmful lies versus 
harmful truth. (* P < 0.05; *** P < 0.001; n.s.: not significant; error bars: s.e.m.) 
 
At the neural level, the amygdala was activated in the interaction effect of (beneficial 
truth - harmful truth) versus (beneficial lies - harmful lies). Beneficial outcomes 
significantly increased amygdalar activity in the truth-telling condition. The amygdala 
plays an important role in the perception and production of emotion or affect (Öhman 
and Mineka, 2001; Phelps et al., 2001; Mason et al., 2006). Previous studies found 
that the amygdala is crucial in the cognitive and intentional control of mood (Brühl et 
al., 2014; Young et al., 2014). Amygdalar activity was increased in the successful 
regulation of negative affect (Diekhof et al., 2011) and was decreased in the presence 
of reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014). In addition to the emotional responses and 
regulations, the amygdala is also associated with reward processing (Gaffan et al., 
1988; Cador et al., 1989; Holland and Gallagher, 1999; Ernst et al., 2005). The 
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emotional experiences of social outcomes (i.e., lies and truth with different monetary 
outcomes) might modulate activity in the amygdala. 
In the main effect of lies versus truth, the anterior insula was activated. The insula is 
another important region in responding to negative events, and has been implicated 
in the experience of monetary loss (O'Doherty et al., 2003), aversion (Paulus et al., 
2003; Chang et al., 2011), disgust (Calder et al., 2000; Sprengelmeyer, 2007), and 
unfairness (Sanfey et al., 2003). The aversive feeling elicited by an immoral mean 
might elicit higher activity in the anterior insula. In Study 2, the anterior insula was 
found to be sensitive to the modulation of altruistic outcomes on moral emotions or 
moral evaluation of the behaviors. However, in Study 3, the anterior insula was not 
activated in the interaction effect of the outcome and mean. In the ratings of moral 
acceptance, lies were judged to be more morally unacceptable, regardless of the 
outcomes. That might explain why the anterior insula was only activated in the main 
effect rather than in the interaction effects, whereas the amygdala might be more 
sensitive to the basic emotional responses to different social outcomes. 
The comparison of lying versus truth-telling also activated the STS, which is critical 
for social perception, i.e., the evaluation of the social communicative intentions of 
others extracted from gaze, facial expressions, body gestures, and motions (Pelphrey 
et al., 2004; Moll et al., 2005). In addition, the posterior STS is also critical for moral 
sensitivity (Robertson et al., 2007). The posterior STS was more active when 
individuals were judging the facial trustworthiness (Bzdok et al.), viewing moral 
pictures (Harenski and Hamann, 2006), and making moral judgments (Moll et al., 
2002a; Greene et al., 2004; Heekeren et al., 2005; Sevinc and Spreng, 2014). In 
previous deception studies, STS activation was observed when participants judged the 
behaviors to be misleading (Grezes et al., 2004; Grezes et al., 2006). The recognition 
of morally transgressive behaviors (e.g., lying) might elicit higher activation in the 
STS (Robertson et al., 2007). 
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The truth-telling behaviors and the beneficial outcomes were perceived as more 
positive and morally acceptable. The main effects of decision (i.e., truth > lies) and 
outcome (i.e., benefit > harm) activated the NAcc. The NAcc codes the processing of 
monetary rewards (Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Adcock et al., 2006; Sabatinelli et al., 
2007). In addition to monetary rewards, the NAcc has been identified in the studies of 
social rewards (Izuma et al., 2008; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009; Häusler et al., 2015). 
In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the faces of intentional cooperators elicited higher 
activity in the NAcc compared to the neutral faces (Singer et al., 2004a). Therefore, in 
Study 3, the social (being honestly treated) and monetary rewards (beneficial 
outcomes) might elicit higher activity in the NAcc. 
7.5. Limitations 
In the beneficial conditions in Study 3, because the decisions made by the senders 
earned the receivers more money, the intention of senders might be perceived as 
altruistic. However, the senders’ decisions not only profited the receivers but also the 
senders. The setting might weaken the effect of the benevolence in beneficial lies if 
recipients assumed that the senders lied to them out of consideration for their own 
interests rather than the recipients’ interests.  
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IV. General discussion 
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In this dissertation, three research questions were investigated. Study 1 was used to 
investigate whether different neural correlates were involved in the (dis)honest 
decision-making process in the spontaneous and instructed paradigms. Study 2 was 
used to investigate the impact of altruistic or self-profit outcomes on the deceptive 
decision-making process and the underlying neural mechanisms from the perspective 
of the communicators. Study 3 was used to investigate the impact of beneficial and 
harmful outcomes on the neural processes underlying lies and truth from the 
perspective of the recipients.  
In Section 1, the key findings from the three studies are first highlighted (Section 8.1), 
followed by a discussion of the differences between laboratory and real-life lies 
(Section 8.2), the cognitive demands of lies and truth in different contexts and 
different individuals (Section 8.3), the impact of altruistic outcomes on the process of 
deception (Section 8.4), and the directions for future studies of deception (Section 
8.5). Finally, a summary of this dissertation is presented in Section 9. 
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8. Discussion 
8.1. Overview of the key results from the three studies 
In Study 1, the most important finding at the behavioral level is that the untruthful 
responses in the spontaneous paradigm (i.e., spontaneous lying/lies) were judged to 
be closer to the concept of lies than the untruthful responses in the instructed 
paradigm (i.e., instructed lying/lies). Regarding the emotional valence, making 
truthful responses was more positive than making untruthful responses in the 
spontaneous paradigm, whereas the opposite pattern was observed in the instructed 
paradigm. At the neural level, the right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), the 
right ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), and the right inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL) were significantly activated by spontaneous truthful responses in partially 
dishonest participants. Compared with the spontaneous truthful responses in honest 
participants, the VLPFLC, the VMPFC, and the IPL were also activated by 
spontaneous truthful responses in partially dishonest participants. 
In Study 2, participants lied more often for the benefit of charitable organizations. At 
the neural level, activation was observed in the right anterior insula (AI) in the 
comparison of lying for oneself and lying for a charity in the conditions with honesty 
concerns to obtain high payoffs. Moreover, AI activity reflects individual differences 
in the altruistic impact on honesty concerns (to which extent the charity-profit 
condition reduced the effect of honesty concerns).  
In Study 3, truth-telling and beneficial outcomes were judged to be more emotionally 
positive and more morally acceptable than lying. Beneficial outcomes decreased the 
valence differences between truth-telling and lies compared with harmful outcomes. 
At the neural level, the comparisons of truth-telling versus lies and beneficial 
outcomes versus harmful outcomes activated the nucleus accumbens (NAcc). In the 
comparison of lies and truth-telling, the left anterior insula was activated. A 
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significant interaction between the outcome and mean was observed in the left 
amygdala, further showing that beneficial truth-telling elicited higher activity in the 
left amygdala. 
8.2. The differences between laboratory lies and real-life lies 
When we consider whether it is feasible to apply the findings from the neuroimaging 
studies to detect lies in real life or even in the court, the weak reliability (i.e., the 
extent to which the studies produce stable and consistent results), external validity 
(i.e., the extent to which the results of the studies can be generalized to other settings, 
to other individuals, and over time), and construct validity (i.e., the extent to which 
the studies test what they were designed to test) of the laboratory studies were the 
focus of the debate (Schauer, 2010). Differences exist between lies in the laboratory 
and real-life lies, particularly when the instructed paradigms were used to investigate 
deception in the laboratory (Kanwisher, 2009; Phelps, 2009).  
Many human behaviors and decisions are guided by the motivation to achieve 
pleasant states and avoid unpleasant states (Daw et al., 2006; Linke et al., 2010). The 
motives to lie can be defined according to three dimensions (Vrij, 2007): (1) for one’s 
own benefit (self-oriented) or for the benefit of others (other-oriented), (2) to gain 
advantage or to avoid costs, and (3) for materialistic reasons or for psychological 
reasons. However, in most instructed studies, the motives to lie are relatively weak. It 
might be better to use mock-crime scenarios25 to investigate lying behaviors because 
participants might be more involved in the experiment and the situation might be 
more similar to a real life situation. However, even in the mock-crime scenarios, 
                                                   
25  In the task, participants are usually assigned to a mock-crime group or a no-crime group. 
Participants in the mock-crime group conduct a mock crime (e.g., gun shooting in the hospital 
(Mohamed et al., 2006) or damaging and stealing CDs (Kozel et al., 2009a)). Participants in the no-
crime group do not conduct any mock crime. After that, participants answer questions about the details 
of the crime, personal information, and whether they committed the crime. Participants are instructed 
to make truthful or untruthful responses. 
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participants were well aware that the mock-crime situations were artificial (Ganis and 
Keenan, 2009). Previous studies found that the situation where participants had the 
opportunity to make a choice elicited individuals’ affective responses, which were 
associated with increased activity in the corticostriatal region, compared to the 
situation where participants did not have the opportunity to make a choice (Leotti et 
al., 2010; Leotti and Delgado, 2011). In the motivational states, choices were made by 
the interactions between regions in the corticostriatal network (the prefrontal cortex 
and the striatum), which was different from the states without motivation (Leotti et 
al., 2010). 
With the development of neuroeconomics 26  and experimental paradigms, 
spontaneous paradigms have been used more often in neuroimaging studies of 
deception. In contrast to the instructed paradigms, participants are allowed to freely 
decide to lie or to tell the truth. The representative studies are from Greene and 
Paxton (Greene and Paxton, 2009) and Baumgartner and his colleagues 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009). In the spontaneous paradigms, participants are usually 
placed in the incentivizing contexts, where they are tempted to deceive others and 
earn more benefits for themselves. The mental processes of spontaneous lies,  such as 
cognitive control (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Zhu et al., 2014) and emotional 
responses (Ekman, 1985, 1989), might be different from the mental processes of 
instructed lies. A direct comparison of untruthful responses in these two types of 
experimental paradigms was performed in Study 1. The subjective judgments about 
two types of untruthful responses showed that spontaneous lies were closer to the 
concept of “lies” than instructed lies. The results suggest that the motivation to lie and 
spontaneous choices are essential to reduce the difference between lies in a laboratory 
environment and lies in our daily life.  
                                                   
26 Neuroeconomics is an interdisciplinary field that aims to investigate human decision-making process 
and develop theories to understand human behaviors. It combines research methods from 
neuroscience, economics, and psychology. 
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8.3. Lying and truth-telling: which is more cognitively demanding? 
In many previous functional neuroimaging studies of deception, many brain regions, 
particularly the executive brain regions, were activated when participants were giving 
untruthful responses. The DLPFC is one of the regions that was activated in the 
comparison of instructed lies and truth (Lee et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2005; Luan Phan 
et al., 2005; Nunez et al., 2005; Abe et al., 2006; Abe et al., 2007). The disruption of 
the right DLPFC decreased the dishonest response rate (Karton and Bachmann, 2011; 
Karton et al., 2014), and facilitating the right DLPFC increased the dishonest 
response rate (Karton et al., 2014). However, truthful responses rarely elicited higher 
neural activity than untruthful responses (Christ et al., 2009; Farah et al., 2014). 
Similar activation patterns have been observed not only in the studies that used the 
instructed paradigms but also in some studies of spontaneous lying and truth-telling 
(Bhatt et al., 2010; Sip et al., 2010). In a study of broken promises (Baumgartner et 
al., 2009), the left DLPFC was activated when dishonest participants were making 
promises that they intended to break compared with the promises they were not going 
to break. The DLPFC exerts a key function in tasks that require a high level of 
cognitive control (Sanfey et al., 2003; Aron et al., 2004; Spitzer et al., 2007). In 
studies of self-control, disruption of the right DLPFC weakened individuals’ ability to 
resist economic temptation (Knoch et al., 2006b) and increased individuals’ risky 
behaviors (Knoch et al., 2006a; Knoch and Fehr, 2007). The previous findings seem 
to support the notion that lying might be more cognitively demanding, whereas truth-
telling is more like a default behavior (Spence et al., 2004), and the greater 
involvement of self-control during lying evokes higher DLPFC activity.  
Section 2.1 introduced the findings from studies of the reaction times for lying and 
truth-telling. Compared with truth-telling, lying seems to require more time. However, 
practice can reduce the response times for lying (Walczyk et al., 2009; Verschuere et 
al., 2011; Hu et al., 2012). In addition, dishonest behaviors were decreased in the 
situation where the response time was not restricted compared with the situation 
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where the response time was restricted (Shalvi et al., 2012). Moreover, self-depletion 
can increase the frequencies of lying (Mead et al., 2009; Gino et al., 2011; Kouchaki 
and Smith, 2014). These findings suggest that the cognitive demands of dishonesty 
can be modulated and honesty also requires more time and cognitive control in 
certain contexts. In Study 1, no significant difference in the reaction times was 
observed between lying and truth-telling. In addition, greater involvement of the right 
VLPFC, the right DLPFC, and the right IPL was observed when partially dishonest 
participants spontaneously provided truthful responses that led to a monetary loss. In 
previous studies, the prefrontal cortex was also believed to participate in making 
honest decisions, particularly in the experiments that used the spontaneous 
paradigms. In a coin-flip task (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe and Greene, 2014), 
participants predicted the outcomes of coin flips. Correct predictions led to monetary 
benefits. In the condition without the opportunity to cheat, participants had to 
explicitly report their predictions and then indicated whether their predictions were 
correct. In the condition with the cheating opportunity, participants did not have to 
explicitly report their predictions, and, therefore, they could earn more money by 
lying about their predictions. When dishonest individuals were lying and when they 
were telling the truth, activation was observed in the control-related regions, 
including the DLPFC and the VLPFC. In one lesion study (Zhu et al., 2014), 
individuals with lesions in the DLPFC showed reduced honesty concerns and lied 
more often when playing the sender-receiver game as senders compared with OFC 
lesioned patients and healthy controls. The researchers further speculated that the 
engagement of the DLPFC during lying might reflect the active but ultimately 
unsuccessful involvement of cognitive control. These findings suggest that the DLPFC 
plays a critical role in both the dishonest decision-making process and the honest 
decision-making process.  
Compared with lying, telling the truth can be more cognitively demanding to some 
individuals in some circumstances. The cognitive resources required for lying and 
truth-telling might be context- and individual-dependent. In the contexts with a weak 
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motivation to lie (e.g., the lack of monetary or social rewards), truth-telling might be 
more like a default behavior and would, therefore, require fewer cognitive resources. 
However, in the contexts with a strong motivation to lie (e.g., avoiding punishments 
or gaining rewards), truth-telling might require additional cognitive control to fight 
against the temptation of dishonest gain. Moreover, different individuals might have 
different allocations of cognitive resources when they are making the decisions. In 
Study 1, partially dishonest participants required greater involvement of the VLPFC, 
the DLPFC, and the IPL than honest participants when they were telling the truth in 
the spontaneous session to forfeit monetary gains. Similar results were reported by 
Greene and Paxton (2009). Honest individuals might require less cognitive effort to 
make honest decisions compared with dishonest individuals who might expend more 
effort to forfeit immoral gains.  
8.4. The impact of altruistic outcomes on the process of deception 
Mounting evidence suggests that lying is psychologically costly (Lundquist et al., 
2009). Previous studies found that introducing honesty concerns in economic 
decision-making made people choose the materially advantageous allocation less 
often (Gneezy, 2005) and people tended to avoid the situations with honesty concerns 
(Shalvi et al., 2011b). Even if the lies would not be punished and would not cause any 
financial harm to others, many individuals still forfeited larger benefits and behaved 
honestly (Erat and Gneezy, 2012; López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013), suggesting that 
there are psychological costs of lying. 
Nevertheless, the attitudes toward lying (e.g., acceptability) might be linked to its 
good or bad outcomes (DePaulo, 2004). From the perspective of the recipients and 
third-party observers, altruistic lies that benefit others were judged to be morally 
appropriate (Hayashi et al., 2014; Levine and Schweitzer, 2014). In addition, the 
altruistic outcomes of lies can increase trust in liars who told prosocial lies (Levine 
and Schweitzer, 2015). From the perspectives of the communicators, a certain number 
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of participants chose to lie to profit others, even at the expense of their own payoff 
(Erat and Gneezy, 2012). Lying behavior was observed even more frequently if it 
benefited charities (Lewis et al., 2012).  
Moral goals or intentions influence people’s decisions or judgments by modulating the 
negative attitudes or emotional responses toward the immoral means. The findings 
from moral judgment studies suggest that emotions played an integral role in the 
judgments toward moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001). The avoid-related and 
approach-related social emotions (such as disgust, admiration, and compassion) and 
associated emotional networks (such as the anterior cingulate, the anterior insula, 
and the hypothalamus) are vital to moral evaluation (Funk and Gazzaniga, 2009). 
Previous studies in the field of social neuroscience implicated the social brain network 
including the brain regions of the insula/ACC, the amygdala, the temporoparietal 
junction, the DLPFC, the VMPFC, and the striatum (Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). The 
increased activity in the amygdala when encountering beneficial truth-telling might 
reflect the process of a rewarding situation. The amygdala is involved in the processes 
of stimuli with positive valence and reward (Baxter and Murray, 2002; Murray, 2007; 
Anders et al., 2008; Ball et al., 2009; Morrison and Salzman, 2010). In animal studies, 
selective amygdala lesions can affect the ability to associate stimuli with reward value 
(Gaffan et al., 1988; Cador et al., 1989; Holland and Gallagher, 1999). In human 
studies, activity in the amygdala and the NAcc was increased for both adolescents and 
adults when they were winning money (as opposed to not winning money) (Ernst et 
al., 2005).  
Nevertheless, the amygdala also plays a major role in the perception and production 
of negative emotion or affect (Öhman and Mineka, 2001; Phelps et al., 2001; Mason et 
al., 2006). When perceiving stimuli of aversive content, healthy people show 
enhanced attention (compared with the perception of neutral content). However, 
lesions in the bilateral amygdala damage this improved attention toward emotionally 
significant stimuli (Anderson and Phelps, 2001), suggesting that the amygdala 
ensures that the emotional events capture enough attention. In the study of loss 
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aversion (i.e., the avoidance of choices that might lead to losses), people with lesions 
in the amygdala showed a reduction in loss aversion in a gambling task compared 
with the normal controls (De Martino et al., 2010). In previous neuroimaging studies 
addressing the judgment of lying and truth-telling behaviors, the amygdala was more 
active when participants thought they were being deceived by the experimenter 
(Grezes et al., 2006) and the amygdala was more active toward participants’ own 
moral violation (Berthoz et al., 2006). The role of the amygdala in the interaction 
between the mean and outcome might be associated with the process of the emotional 
responses to social outcomes. 
Concerning the insula, it involves in multiple domains, such as perceptual decision-
making (Binder et al., 2004; Thielscher and Pessoa, 2007), deceptive decision-
making (Christ et al., 2009; Farah et al., 2014; Lisofsky et al., 2014), and empathy 
(Singer et al., 2004b; Jackson et al., 2005). In a broken promises study (Baumgartner 
et al., 2009), the researchers used a trust game where participants (as trustees) could 
either make a promise about paying back money or have no chance to make any 
promise. They then waited for an investor’s decision to trust them or not. If the 
investor trusted them, participants decided to pay back or keep the money. In the 
dishonest participants, promises of paying back the money (versus the no promise 
condition) elicited increased activity in the right anterior insula and the IFG during 
the promise stage, whereas the no promise condition elicited higher activity in the 
anterior insula and the IFG during the anticipation stage. The authors speculated that 
the former was associated with aversive emotional experiences of providing 
misleading promises, and the latter was due to the anticipation of negative and 
unforeseeable emotional events.  
In the social domain, the anterior insula can detect deviations from the socially 
acceptable outcome (Glimcher and Fehr, 2013) and is associated with the prediction 
and detection of other aversive stimuli (Nitschke et al., 2006; Caria et al., 2010; 
Chang et al., 2011; Liljeholm et al., 2014). In the ultimatum game, the introduction of 
sad emotions (Harlé et al., 2012) and the reappraisal of the proposer’s intentions as 
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more negative (Grecucci et al., 2012) increased the responders’ rejection rates toward 
unfair offers and activity in the anterior insula when facing unfair offers. The 
tendency to accept unfair proposals was associated with decreased activity in the 
anterior insula, which has been implicated in negative affect (Tabibnia et al., 2008). 
According to the somatic markers’ hypothesis, the bodily emotional systems react to a 
certain act before the cognitive process reacts to its outcomes (Damasio, 1994). The 
anterior insula is one of the key brain regions representing the somatic state that 
arises in emotion processing, particularly negative emotions (Bechara and Damasio, 
2005; Naqvi et al., 2006), and provides knowledge for making fast and advantageous 
economic decisions (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). When individuals encounter moral 
events, the anterior insula might detect the transgressions in the events by generating 
negative or aversive feelings.  
8.5. Directions for future studies  
Studies of deception in the laboratory settings are informative and improve our 
understanding of deception in the real world. The fMRI-based lie detection method is 
applied according to the findings from the neuroimaging studies of lying. In some 
cases, lying elicits higher activation in multiple brain regions compared with truth-
telling. However, in the context where truth-telling is more cognitively demanding, 
honest responses might be mistakenly classified as lies (Farah et al., 2014). When an 
individual is responding to a question, a lack of activation in areas associated with 
inhibition or cognitive control cannot confirm that the individual is telling the truth 
(Meijer et al., 2016). Therefore, the paradigms used in the laboratory experiments to 
examine deception are important (Ganis and Keenan, 2009), and the gaps between 
the laboratory lies and lies in real life should be reduced.  
Several issues should be considered when researchers are conducting experiments to 
investigate the neural correlates of deception. First, whether (dis)honest decisions are 
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made on participants’ own initiative should be taken into consideration. The neural 
processes of instructed lies differ from the neural processes of spontaneous lies. Lies 
in the experimental settings where participants can spontaneously make their 
decisions to lie, compared with lies in the settings where participants can only follow 
others’ instructions to lie, might be more similar to the lies in real life. Spontaneous 
paradigms provide us knowledge about lies in real life. In some spontaneous 
paradigms, to identify when participants lie in the scanner, participants’ behaviors are 
under observation. However, participants might make different decisions if they know 
that they are under observation. To reduce the effects caused by the observation, 
experimenters can tell participants that experimenters are not observing while 
participants are making decisions and their data will be analyzed by researchers who 
have no access to their personal information. Nevertheless, it is important to develop 
new paradigms in which participants can privately make decisions and participants’ 
behaviors can be monitored during the experiment.  
Second, manipulations, such as inducing social interaction and punishment for 
dishonesty, should be considered. Social interaction involved in the experiment is 
important for understanding lying in the context where participants interact with 
others. In many instructed studies, participants lied to a investigator/experimenter 
(Davatzikos et al., 2005; Langleben et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2005; Luan Phan et al., 
2005), or participants did not lie to a specific person (Ganis et al., 2003; Lee et al., 
2010). The context with social interaction might have different impacts on individuals 
with different social preferences and make individuals take the perspective of 
opponents, and, therefore, social interaction influence the neural correlates of lying 
(Lisofsky et al., 2014). By adopting interactive games (Sip et al., 2010; Volz et al., 
2015), cognitive processes involved in social interaction during lying can be further 
investigated. Moreover, punishment for dishonesty is an important manipulated 
variable. Punishment for dishonesty might influence the decision-making process of 
lying through modulating the expected value of dishonest behaviors.  
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Third, different kinds of lies should be investigated, and some other techniques 
should be used to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying deception. Different 
motivations and situations influence the psychological and neural mechanisms 
underlying lying and truth-telling. Monetary or social outcomes caused by lies can be 
manipulated to investigated different kinds of lies. Moreover, techniques like the skin 
conductance response, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), and 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) provide us information about participants’ 
physiologically arousing states and the effects caused by disruption or facilitation of a 
specific brain region.  
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9. Summary 
Deception is an important social phenomenon. A paradigm of “instructed lies” was 
used in many previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of 
deception. Instructed lies are different from other, more spontaneous lying behaviors. 
Study 1 investigated whether there are different neural mechanisms underlying the 
deceptive decision-making process in the spontaneous and the instructed paradigms. 
A modified sic bo gambling game was used to incentivize lying and enhance 
participants’ involvement, particularly in the spontaneous paradigm. In the 
spontaneous session, participants freely decided whether to lie, whereas in the 
instructed session they were explicitly instructed to make either truthful or untruthful 
responses. Spontaneous untruthful responses were closer to the concept of “lies” than 
instructed untruthful responses. In addition, at the neural level, the right dorsal 
lateral prefrontal cortex, the right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex, and the right 
inferior parietal lobule were more strongly activated by spontaneous truth-telling 
(versus other decisions, including spontaneous lying, instructed lying, and instructed 
truth-telling). These regions were also activated when comparing the spontaneous 
truth told by dishonest participants with the spontaneous truth told by honest 
participants. The results of Study 1 suggest that the extra cognitive control required to 
suppress the motives of benefiting oneself by lying evokes greater involvement of the 
frontoparietal network. 
Study 2 and Study 3 were performed to investigate the neural correlates of the impact 
of altruistic outcomes on the process of deception from the perspectives of 
communicators and recipients, respectively. In Study 2, a modified sender-receiver 
paradigm was adopted, where participants could earn different amounts of money by 
lying or telling the truth to benefit either a charity or themselves. Participants lied 
more often to benefit charities than to benefit themselves. The altruistic impact on 
honesty concerns is associated with the anterior insula, which was activated when 
participants lied to benefit themselves (versus charitable organizations). Furthermore, 
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anterior insula activity reflected individual differences in the modulation of the 
altruistic outcomes on honesty concerns. The results suggest that the anterior insula is 
the key hub for integrating information from different streams of outcomes and acts 
to detect the deviations in socially or morally acceptable acts. 
Study 3 was performed to investigate how monetary outcomes influence the neural 
responses to lies and truth. A modified sender-receiver game was used, where 
participants were the direct recipients of lies and truthful statements with beneficial 
or harmful monetary outcomes. Both truth-telling and beneficial outcomes elicited 
higher activity in the nucleus accumbens, suggesting that the nucleus accumbens is 
associated with the process of monetary and social rewards. Compared with truth, lies 
elicited higher activity in the supplementary motor area, the inferior frontal gyrus, the 
superior temporal sulcus, and the anterior insula. Moreover, the beneficial monetary 
outcomes enhanced the neural activity in the amygdala in the truth-telling condition. 
The results identified a neural network associated with the reception of lies and truth 
with different outcomes, including the regions linked to the reward process, 
recognition, and emotional experiences of being treated (dis)honestly.  
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10. English abstract 
Investigating the process of deception is crucial for our understanding of lying 
behaviors. In this dissertation, three studies were performed to investigate: 1) the 
neural bases of lying and truth-telling in two different experimental paradigms and 2) 
the impact of the altruistic outcomes (i.e., the outcomes of the acts that financially 
benefit others) on the processes of lies and truth. In Study 1, participants provided 
(un)truthful responses either on one’s own initiative in the spontaneous paradigm or 
by following others’ instructions in the instructed paradigm. The behavioral results 
suggest that the free choice of making one’s own decisions is one of the key 
components of the concept of “lies.” At the neural level, the ventral lateral prefrontal 
cortex, the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex, and the inferior parietal lobe showed 
different activation patterns in the two different paradigms. The results suggest that 
these regions might provide cognitive control over the temptation of dishonest gain, 
particularly in the paradigms that allow individuals to freely make their decisions. In 
Study 2 and Study 3, the outcomes of lying/truth-telling behaviors were manipulated 
to investigate the neural correlates of the impact of altruistic outcomes on the 
processes of the behaviors in both the communicators and the recipients. The results 
showed that the altruistic outcomes of moral behaviors mainly modulated neural 
activity in the nucleus accumbens, the amygdala, and the anterior insula. The nucleus 
accumbens might be sensitive to both social rewards and monetary rewards. The 
amygdala might be involved in generating emotional responses to social outcomes, 
whereas the anterior insula might code deviations from socially or morally acceptable 
acts. Taken together, the results suggest that the neural processes underlying 
deception in the frontoparietal network, the limbic system, the mesolimbic system, 
and the insula cortex are associated with the psychological processes of deception, 
including cognitive control, reward coding, and emotional responses. The findings 
extend our knowledge of the neural processes underlying lies and truth in different 
contexts and with different outcomes.  
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11. German abstract 
Die Untersuchung von Täuschungsprozessen ist für das Verständnis des 
Themengebiets des Lügens unabdingbar. Im Rahmen dieser Dissertation wurden drei 
Studien durchgeführt, um 1) die neuronale Basis von Lügen und wahrheitsgemäßen 
Angaben mithilfe von zwei unterschiedlichen experimentellen Paradigmen zu 
untersuchen, sowie 2) den Einfluss von altruistischen Ergebnissen (d.h. die 
Ergebnisse von Entscheidungen, die Anderen einen finanziellen Vorteil verschaffen) 
auf die Prozesse von „Lügen“ und „Wahrheit sagen“ zu eruieren. In Studie 1 konnten 
die Probanden in dem „spontanen Paradigma“ selbst bestimmen, ob sie wahre oder 
unwahre Angaben machen, während sie in dem „instruierten Paradigma“ von 
Anderen die Vorgabe für diese Entscheidung erhielten. Die behavioralen Ergebnisse 
von Studie 1 legen nahe, dass die freie Wahl der eigenen Entscheidungen eine der 
Schlüsselkomponenten des Konzepts des „Lügens“ darstellt. Auf der neuronalen 
Ebene zeigten der ventrolaterale präfrontale Kortex, der dorsolaterale präfrontale 
Kortex und der untere Parietallappen unterschiedliche Aktivierungsmuster in den 
beiden Paradigmen. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass diese Regionen kognitive 
Kontrolle über die Versuchung von unehrlichem Gewinn bieten können, insbesondere 
in den Paradigmen, die es Individuen erlauben, freie Entscheidungen zu treffen. In 
den Studien 2 und 3 wurden die aus betrügerischem/wahrheitsgemäßem Verhalten 
resultierenden Ergebnisse manipuliert, um die neuronalen Korrelate des Einflusses 
von altruistischen Ergebnissen auf das Verhalten des möglichen Lügners und des 
Empfängers zu untersuchen. Die Resultate zeigen, dass altruistische Motive des 
moralischen Verhaltens hauptsächlich die neuronale Aktivität im Nucleus accumbens, 
der Amygdala und der anterioren Insula modulierten. Der Nucleus accumbens könnte 
sowohl auf soziale Belohnungen (ehrlich behandelt zu werden) als auch auf monetäre 
Belohnungen (höhere monetäre Zahlungen zu erhalten) sensibel reagieren. Die 
Amygdala könnte im Erzeugen emotionaler Antworten auf soziale Ergebnisse 
involviert sein, wohingegen die anteriore Insula Abweichungen von sozial oder 
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moralisch akzeptablen Handlungen kodieren könnte. Zusammengenommen legen die 
Ergebnisse nahe, dass die neuronalen Täuschungsprozesse im frontoparietalen 
Netzwerk, im limbschen System, im mesolimbischen System und der Insula mit den 
psychologischen Prozessen der Täuschung, inklusive kognitiver Kontrolle, 
Belohnungskodierung und emotionaler Antworten assoziiert sind. Die Befunde 
erweitern unser Verständnis über die zu Grunde liegenden Prozesse von Lügen und 
Wahrhaftigkeit in unterschiedlichen Kontexten und unterschiedlichen Zielen. 
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